Today we learned from Fox News that 34 people have been separated from the Navy for cheating on qualification tests at the Charleston, South Carolina prototype training site:
The number of accused and the duration of cheating are greater than was known when the Navy announced in February that it had discovered cheating on qualification exams by an estimated 20 to 30 sailors seeking to be certified as instructors at the nuclear training unit at Charleston, South Carolina.
At least 10 more are currently under investigation, and their status at this time is unclear.
Social media pages involving Navy nukes are obviously talking about this. While all are glad that this cheating ring was busted, many were unsurprised by the fact that it occurred.
Prototype is the third stage in the training of prospective nuclear plant operators. After graduation from Basic Training at Great Lakes, “baby nukes” are sent to Charleston to attend Nuclear Field “A” School as either Machinist Mates, Electricians Mates, or Electronics Technicians. Then they attend 24 weeks of Nuclear Power School, where they are taught everything from math and Physics to metallurgy, reactor dynamics, Chemistry, and further in-rate and cross-rate knowledge. Prototype also starts with more classroom training before students move “in-hull”, as we called it back in the day. There, students stand “under instruction” watches and learn about all systems within the plant.
Qualifications are closely monitored, with students required to make continuous progress and stay “ahead of the curve”. Written exams are given, and when the qualification card (book) is complete, the student is given an oral qualification board with 3-4 staff members quizzing the student on any and all plant systems. At this point, the student is then considered ready for assignment to a carrier or submarine, although qualification on the ship/submarine they are assigned to may take up to another year after they arrive at their ultimate duty station.
(Admiral) Richardson (Head of Naval Reactors) said he met individually with each of the accused and heard at least two common themes: a belief that there was little risk of getting caught, and a work environment at the nuclear training site that created stresses and pressures on the approximately 300 sailors who serve as instructors.
IMHO, there are several reasons why this culture came about. This is not the first cheating scandal to occur in the Nuclear Navy–there have been cases aboard the USS Memphis and USS Eisenhower, but this is the first notable cheating scandal to occur at a training command, and involving staff members.
The prototypes in question are what were referred to as “floatotypes”–reconverted ballistic missile submarines whose engine rooms serve as the training platforms for the students assigned there after Nuclear Power School. These plants are now 50 years old. Simply keeping them running is proving to be a challenge, to the point the staff doesn’t have enough time to qualify themselves, let alone perform their primary function of qualifying students.
Next, for about 15-20 years now, the mentality in training for nuclear power seems to have shifted from a “filter” to a “pump” mentality. The attrition rate 25+ years ago in Nuclear Power School alone could be as high as 30-40 percent. My class was lucky–we lost “only” 25 percent. Although most of the losses occurred in “A” school and NPS, by no means was a student guaranteed to graduate prototype, and a number did fail out. But the need for instructors and staff became so acute, after around 2000, the Top 50/Top 50 (top 50 percent in both NPS and Prototype) requirement was set aside. Talking to some folks who were instructors, this was a mistake. Folks who should never have been able to screen for instructor duty did so, and their lack of knowledge was glaring.
Most of the folks who were cheating were “sea-returnees”, people who had at least one tour under their belts, and some more. These were not people fresh out of the pipeline. Many were First Class Petty Officers or even Chief Petty Officers, who SHOULD have had at least the “big picture” knowledge on how to run a plant safely and maximize propulsion–the two key goals of any ship or submarine. The senior enlisted watch on board a submarine is Engineering Watch Supervisor (EWS). These watchstanders are the eyes and ears of the Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW), and in fact underway they relieve the EOOW as required or during emergency. Most of the people caught cheating had EWS qualifications at their underway commands. The fact that the prototype was a different type of plant is really less concern than one might think–pumps are pumps, valves are valves, etc., and it’s just a matter of how they’re put together that makes plants different.
Finally, Naval Reactors is, to put it nicely, assholes when it comes to training, particularly testing. Scores must fit in a certain range–too high, the test was too easy. Too low, the test is too hard, but you can’t have a test with NO failures, and Rickover’s ghost help you if you’re the “designated failure”. Some of it makes sense, some of it you just kind of shrug and accept, and some is just jaw-dropping fucktardery.
Imagine Naval Reactors or the ORSE team coming on and telling the E/RC Divisions that their test on Electrical Safety was too easy because they had no failures. Really? No shit? Hey, they had no failures because IT’S THEIR FREAKING JOB! If they did fail electrical safety CT Exams, should they really be sticking their asses in switchgear or energized equipment drawers? Frankly, it’s an archaic method of gauging knowledge, and not a very effective one.
It creates more knowledgeable operators, to be sure, but it gets to a point it becomes nearly impossible to complete the tests in the allotted timeframe. We’re talking 100-page EWS exams that had to be completed in 8 hours or less. No multiple choice, no fill-in-the-blank. Essay questions, every one. Failure to put down key words, phrases, or adequately explain detail down to incredibly silly detail in some cases would be enough to create a failure. Failure could be cause for getting booted out of instructor duty, an almost certain career-ending result.
So we have overworked instructors, who may or may not have been good choices for instructor duty, given exams that were wholly unrealistic tests of their knowledge. End result? See above.
Unfortunately, Naval Reactors (and Big Navy) have, to paraphrase Monty Python, found their witch, and they have burned them. But they won’t really address the issues that led up to this. Treat the symptom, not the disease.
