Thanks to Aunty Brat who messaged me on Facebook about this Fox News article which reports that Biden comment about the Taliban not being the enemy was taken out of context. Well, and yeah, but they don’t bother to give us any context except a faulty interpretation of recent history;
“It is a simple fact that we went into Afghanistan because of the attack on the United States on Sept. 11, 2001. We are there now to ultimately defeat Al Qaeda, to stabilize Afghanistan and stabilize it in part so that Al Qaeda or other terrorists who have as their aim attacks on the United States cannot establish a foothold again in that country,” Carney continued.
Um, the simple fact is that we did indeed strike at Afghanistan because of al Qaeda’s attack on US soil, but the first thing we did was provide support to the Northern Alliance so they could toss the Taliban out and the majority of the fighting has been against remaining elements of Taliban and the Haqqanis. The Taliban has been targeting Afghan civilians with most of their terror attacks,
In fact, before the attack on September 11th, 2001, al Qaeda targeted the Taliban’s main enemy Ahmad Shah Massoud who commanded the Northern Alliance in an assassination.
Preventing a resurgence of al Qaeda in Afghanistan means destroying the Taliban. How we do that without recognizing that they’re our enemy is beyond me and probably beyond anyone who puts a moment’s thought into the subject. I guess that would leave Bite Me out of a rational discussion.
“The Japanese government, per se, isn’t our enemy.” – Henry A. Wallace, Dec. 8, 1941.
Well, of COURSE they provided no context. There IS no context within which his statement would make any sense.
Duh.
I can’t lay claim to know what is bouncing around Biden’s head like a fart in a whirlwind, but he could have ultimately meant, in his own gaffegacious way…..that realistically, there are different strategic perceptions of what defines an enemy.
The Taliban, Haqqani, HiG, etc….are our enemy by default. They are trying to kill us and we are trying to kill them. But they are not near the same level of threat as al Qaeda, or the various franchises.
Anyway, just a guess at what he could have meant.
You would think they’d have learned to keep the microphone away from Biden by now. The guy can’t be anywhere near one without saying something utterly retarded.
Fox could have saved themselves a lot of effort by just reporting that Bite-Me has been, is and will forever be, out of context. Not taken out of context, just out of context.
From “Stand Up, Chuck” to the guy in the wheelchair, to “the Taliban per se is not our enemy. That’s critical”. All of this from a guy who thinks that J-O-B-S is a 3 letter word?
I repeat my previous assertion that It all kind of seems laughable right now, but do you remember how Sarah Palins most minor gaffs got blasted all over the news, and this jacktard gaffs again and again and again and somehow we shouldn’t be worried?
But you know what was really scary? The presidential line of succession until 2010
1). Biden
2). Pelosi
3). Ried
$). Clinton
Kind of makes you thankful that we aren’t the hardcore racists that the MSN claims we are. could you imagine president Biden? I shudder to think.
Then, as I have said on Facebook, who the fuck was I over there fighting on the human terrain? I mean what the fuck is this dumbass eating, its gotta be something in the food causing him to be such a fucktard!
Biden is a confirmed liar, cheat, and plagiarist–going back many years. He is a dumb as a brick–going back years. He is a nasty little prick–going back years. So much for Delaware voters–goinf back years.
“Preventing a resurgence of al Qaeda in Afghanistan means destroying the Taliban.” this is exactly right. There is a distinction between reconciling former members of a movement and the entire organisation. A distinction Biden was not making.
3#”The Taliban, Haqqani, HiG, etc….are our enemy by default. They are trying to kill us and we are trying to kill them. But they are not near the same level of threat as al Qaeda, or the various franchises.” I agree with you but that is not what Biden was implying. There are individuals of said former movements, who hopefully can be brought back into the government fold. Then there are organisations(like the Quetta Shura or HIG) upon who’s very purpose is predicated on bringing down said government.
Al Qaeda and the Taliban are intertwined and can not be seperated, they serve the exact same cause. Al Qaeda furnished a “brigade” to battle the northern alliance before 9/11. They have reconstituted their so called “Shadow Army”(Lashkar Al-Zil) to fight both Nato and the Pakistani Army(which they have defeated three times!).
@9 – You may be correct on Biden’s remarks…I can’t know what he meant.
I do disagree on the intertwining of al Qaeda and the ‘Taliban’…perhaps I’m being nitpicky as this problem is inherent to my job. The Taliban’s stated goals are national, not global. Is there some crossover with AQ’s vision, sure. But the ‘Taliban’ are not a threat to our national security, outside of our presence in Afghanistan. There is also a sizable amount of open source information that speaks to the idea that if the Taliban regained even a rump autonomous Baluchistan, they would not invite al Qaeda back as guests. It didn’t work out very well for them the last time.
Interestingly, the Pak based Tehrik-i-Taliban do share the Caliphate vision.
The main argument I hear for a near perpetual presence in Afghanistan, is to keep that sodding excuse for a nation becoming a safe haven for Islamic terror groups. I would argue that those groups have illustrated that they don’t need AFG anymore than nay other nation they’re infesting.
But I do rather doubt Biden, or most political figures on our national stage ever really get into the weeds on this topic.
#10 “The Taliban’s stated goals are national, not global. Is there some crossover with AQ’s vision, sure.” Al Qaeda is a Van guard organisation, its immediate cause is intertwined.
“There is also a sizable amount of open source information that speaks to the idea that if the Taliban regained even a rump autonomous Baluchistan, they would not invite al Qaeda back as guests. It didn’t work out very well for them the last time.” There is also alot of information pointing in the exat opposite direction, that the next generation of the Taliban see themselves as part of a localised/regional but global jihadist movement. I hope your right but I tend to lean the other way, though I am opened to reconsidering.
Second as to the Taliban not inviting Al Qaeda back if they regain the country, why wouldn’t they? They would be victorious over the other super power, a defeat Al Qaeda had played a huge role in. How if necessary would we reintervene in a land locked country, where we had few allies, a second time? Who would trust or stick there necks out for us? This idea that Al Qaeda won’t be reinvited is just wishful thinking, I see no evidence. It’s kind of like that flatly wrong statment of Al Qaeda only numbering a 100 fighters in Afghanistan, its simply false, more wishful thinking. Hope is not a plan.
“Interestingly, the Pak based Tehrik-i-Taliban do share the Caliphate vision” As I said above which Al Qaeda has also fought alongside of. The Pak Taliban and the Afghan Taliban maybe be separate entities but they do have alot of cadre and philosophical crossover. No offense there CI, but your making my above point for me.
“I would argue that those groups have illustrated that they don’t need AFG anymore than nay other nation they’re infesting.” Again I agree at present the tribal areas of Pakistan are better suited, Afghanistan would be better for them though because it would be harder for us to access.
@11 – Allow me to start with the last point.
If the Taliban regain power, it is highly unlikely it would be anywhere outside of RC-S and RC-SW. The Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen and the lesser tribes are not nearly as amenable to Taliban national rule as they were previously. They’re not amenable to federal rule from Kabul either, but that’s a different issue. Future Taliban controlled areas would be entirely permissive for air and ground strike operations. When we went into AFG in 2001, it was with little more than outdated Soviet maps. Our GEOINT, SIGINT and other capabilities far outmatch any counter from a Taliban rump regime. Our access would be undisputed.
If you wish to lump Islamic extremism under an umbrella, then yes…they’re all interrelated. But if you parse the groups and goals, you can find seams and exploit them for some semblance of success.
The Taliban I/O campaign might see a brief spike in recruitment or financing from a US withdrawal and partial power recoupment…..but it pales in what they can garner with foreign [infidel] military forces occupying a Muslim nation. The breakdown of enemy actors in networks and incidents taking place in AFG gives quite a bit of plausibility to the reported number of AQ in the country. My read is that AQ is there, but not in strength. There’s also my professional opinion that it was and remains part of AQs strategy to lure and keep western military forces engaged in a nation such as AFG for the I/O campaign.
Concerning the relationship between AQ and the QST, there are sources that state each side. We could toss links at each other, but may not persuade in the end. I will add that COMISAF [among others] that the long term relationship is split irrevocably.
Biden is an idiot. Remember the swine-flu scare a few years back? He told on national news that he instructed his family not to travel at all (or something like that). Then, the networks were saying that his words were taken out of context. WTF was taken out of context other than he is an idiot?
I’m thinking that his hairplugs are the only thing that’s alive between his ears.
#12 Let me chop this up.
1)”If the Taliban regain power, it is highly unlikely it would be anywhere outside of RC-S and RC-SW.” Highly unlikely, this may have been their heartland, but the Taliban have mostly been crushed in Helmand and Kandahar provinces. They have exploded in the West, North-West, east, where we have lost both Nuristan and most of Kunar(there have been a number of attacks launched from these areas at Pakistani security forces recently). The Haqqani network maybe aligned but there are organic commanders with allegiance to the Quetta Shura. Not to mention HIG, a sometime ally and foe. Then there is LET, Al Qaeda, and even rumored occasional appearences by both Kashmiri groups and the Pakistan Taliban.
2)”The Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen and the lesser tribes are not nearly as amenable to Taliban national rule as they were previously.” Sorry CI, I would make the exact opposite point. They have never been amenable, except through force of arms but this is more likely today then under Masood. The Taliban have generally gone out of their way in the North to put none Pashtun faces on the affliates(like the Uzbecks). Let me be very clear, this does not mean there is any kind of stampede by locals to join Mullah Omar’s fan club, but this does create a semicredible, sustainable, and, lethal opposition. This force may not be able to overthrow the government by themselves but they would provide a means or avenue of reconcilation with a newly installed Taliban goevernment.
A good example, though not the Taliban is HIG. They have traditionally been even more Pan-Islamic(and more ruthless) and have significant proportions of recruits from minorities. With their lands overrun by the Taliban in the 90s the organisation went dormant, but with our defeat of in turn them, they have made a huge comeback. Alot of that has to do with our inability to even remotely police there areas, which allowed HIG to fill the gap slowly over a number of years. Hekmatyar maybe a Pashtun but he feasibly can say he runs more then a Pashtun party.
“They’re not amenable to federal rule from Kabul either, but that’s a different issue.” They will be from Kabul if it is run by Omar again. They were nearly defeated under Masood, who do they have today with anywhere near that stature?
“Future Taliban controlled areas would be entirely permissive for air and ground strike operations.” again maybe limited air but very little if any ground forces. We would have almost no access to gain entry.
“When we went into AFG in 2001, it was with little more than outdated Soviet maps. Our GEOINT, SIGINT and other capabilities far outmatch any counter from a Taliban rump regime. Our access would be undisputed.” Thats nice. We have never had a tech gap problem with the Taliban. If you haven’t notice most of our decapitation campaign in Afghanistan has not worked because frankly they have always been able to absorbed those losses. It is simply impossible for the operators to raid the enemy into the ground. They can’t gather enough intel and execute anywhere near reasonably fast enough to make this plausible.
There is one catch and they are the line units, who overtime have inflicted so many casualities on the enemy that their organisation collapses.We have seen this through out the South. They do this by living amongst the locales. By policing and safe guarding locals, they can gather intel, execute missions on HVTs, and above all dismantle shadow governments. That is something tech Gadgets, Operator Raids, and B1s will never accomplish on their own. The last three are complimenatry not substitutes for the regulars.
“If you wish to lump Islamic extremism under an umbrella, then yes…they’re all interrelated. But if you parse the groups and goals, you can find seams and exploit them for some semblance of success.” The problem is most of these organisations immediate goal is the same, our defeat! They may not agree on the aftermath but for now they have the same objective. As I said earlier individuals or small groups can be reconciled but not warring parties. They must be defeated or rendered ineffective or at least managable.
“The Taliban I/O campaign might see a brief spike in recruitment or financing from a US withdrawal and partial power recoupment…..but it pales in what they can garner with foreign [infidel] military forces occupying a Muslim nation.” I agree here somewhat but that is whole huge tangent to go off on. You still do not answer why Al Qaeda would not return.
“The breakdown of enemy actors in networks and incidents taking place in AFG gives quite a bit of plausibility to the reported number of AQ in the country. My read is that AQ is there, but not in strength.” Again just in Kunar and Nuristan there are most certainly more then 100 members of Al Qaeda, nevermind in the North or Pakistan. I would say at a minimum Al Qaeda has a few thousand trained fighters, who are generally very effective. They have kicked the ass out of Pakistani Army more then once(at least three times).
“There’s also my professional opinion that it was and remains part of AQs strategy to lure and keep western military forces engaged in a nation such as AFG for the I/O campaign.” So they say. That also could be them trying to console themselves. “Yeah Mohammed, we got our asses raped in Iraq, but you know we weren’t really fighting to win.”. Iran could make much of the same argument. Either way its not very convincing.
“Concerning the relationship between AQ and the QST, there are sources that state each side. We could toss links at each other, but may not persuade in the end. I will add that COMISAF [among others] that the long term relationship is split irrevocably.” Again, just because there maybe friction doesn’t mean split irrevocably.
Numbering was a good start, but I wish you would have continued. This discussion goes longer than the typical, though very stimulating.
1,2 – Whack-a-mole. You are quite correct; we surged in S and SW…the bad guy hits in E, N and Capitol. Not so much in west. The ‘Pashutnistan’ region of AFG is the only area they would enjoy any sort of autonomy, post US presence. The tribal dynamics of the other regions preclude the liklihood of spreading that influence beyond…not to mention that there will always be an opposition, ala Northern Alliance/Karzai Regime. The Afghans in the other regions do benefit from Taliban shadow government in their areas due to the relative ethics of the governance and juducial system compared to that of Kabul. But, one of the many problems in the Kabul federated experiment is the dynaimcs between Pashtuns and the other tribes. If given the opportunity, they will try their own hand at autonomy.
Hekmatyar is playing both sides of the fence. His cooperation with the QST is reliant only on his self interest. To the point of someone of Masood stature, there is no on eperson that could be named at this point. But that doesn’t preclude circumstances from giving rise to that sort of entity. We have enabled several personalities to gain and weild power with the force of arms and money. There may not be a Msood, but there will be opposition.
“Thats nice. We have never had a tech gap problem with the Taliban. If you haven’t notice most of our decapitation campaign in Afghanistan has not worked because frankly they have always been able to absorbed those losses. It is simply impossible for the operators to raid the enemy into the ground. They can’t gather enough intel and execute anywhere near reasonably fast enough to make this plausible.”
I disagree. Not on the tech gap, but on the intelligence gap. We have come from a point where we knew virtually nothing about the adversary to a point where we know the majority of available ratlines and other infrastructure that I justifiably can’t get into on this forum. The ability to interdict in support of an embattled Kabul regime, without the necessity of drawing a vast majoirty of assets to force protection is hard to overstate.
“The problem is most of these organisations immediate goal is the same, our defeat! They may not agree on the aftermath but for now they have the same objective.”
Not even remotely disagreeing with this, but it speaks to the larger point that I’ll speak to below.
To AQs numbers in AFG. They mosrt surely rise and fall to some extent with the fighting season, but to put this vaguely…the network builds and threat strem reporting don’t contradict the CIA assessment anywhere I have seen.
“You still do not answer why Al Qaeda would not return.”
I thought this point is failry obvious if you’ve been looking at the evolution of AQ since 9/11. Foremost, though national sancturaies are nice, they are also vulnerable, as the lesson was learned. Terror groups don’t need geographic safe areas to that extent. AQ has morphed into a franchise corporation with a rather mobile and internet based headquarters….with affiliates gaining strength in other permissible environs. With our primary focus on the ‘Taliban’, we’re not taking the fight to al Qaeda. We’re, largely speaking, in a static defense in Afghanistan, absorbing blows from proxies and occaisonally AQ, to keep us interested. Meanwhile, we rely on unmanned strikes, which in locations where we have far less tactical knowledge, are a crapshoot.
I favor a dynamic strike capapbility to hit AQ and afiliates where they are, and where it hurst. That vision, as I see it, will take no small amount of strategic transformation in our intelligence, finance, cyber and military organizations. Unfortunately, I’m not the DNI.
If you argue that the Taliban matters to the overall fight against Islamic terrorism, I think you’d have to also accept that AFG is only the top of a rather lengthy list of geographic places to occupy, with the acceptance of similar results after 10 years.
Finally, for now…I will close with what I found to be a simplistic, but entertaining analogy that comes close to summing up my assessments of OEF-A.
“Imagine a Snickers bar. The Taliban are the chocolate. al-Qaida is the precious gooey nougat inside. We care about the nougat. Nothing must get in the way of our pursuit of the nougat. The chocolate is in our way. So much worse for the chocolate.
The trouble with the Afghanistan war is that right now we care too much about the chocolate. You could make an argument that it’s worth caring about the chocolate because it’s better for us if the nougat goes uncovered. I found that compelling for a while, and to a degree still do. But we’re eating too much chocolate in southern Afghanistan; it’s hurting us in eastern Afghanistan; and it pulls us too deeply into the machinations of Afghan governance, which is like eating the wrapper.
Plus we’re finding out something significant in the drone war. We can eat a lot of nougat without eating any chocolate. The problem there (and also in Afghanistan) is that we also destroy innocent peanuts, with which the Taliban and al-Qaida deliberately intermingle.”
16# “Numbering was a good start, but I wish you would have continued”. Sorry about that. I have found it is hard in a long entry to correct errors. For some reason words just get eaten, it won’t space and that makes it hard to correct long posts. It wouldn’t admit numbers without having to rewrite the whole thing.
1)”Whack-a-mole” I would not label this whack-a-mole. Its not like we surged in the West, so the enemy dispersed to the East. The enemy did have a tendency to push around forces abit in the towns of the South, when they encountered tough Allied resistence. These enemy formations though were fundementally organic to the South, raised and recruited in a macro regional sense. What changed this wasn’t simply the skill level of our guys(though this is true), it was the mass of manpower sent. By my last count the US alone had somewhere around 12-13 infantry battalions(not counting RSTA or recon), and depending on how you compare the Brits organisation, 4-5 more, thats approaching two divisions.
There was no where the enemy could retreat to, retrain and refit in relative safety. They simply over time were attrited out of existence through death, capture, and, reconcilation. With them went the Shadow govenment network and control of almost the entire population. We created a death spire that they simply couldn’t recover from. OPERATORS CAN”T DO THIS!
2)”…the bad guy hits in E, N and Capitol.” Going back to one of your earlier points, different affliates, that do coordinate at times. The Haqqanis were responsible the terror attacks in Kabul and some of the incidences directly south of Kabul. HIG is the main(not the only though) player in Kunar and Nuristan. As to the West, Herat has not actually been silent lately has it? Granted I think the Italians and the Spaniards are out there so there is that caveat.
3)”The tribal dynamics of the other regions preclude the liklihood of spreading that influence beyond.” Tribe is such an arbitary term not to just us but the Afghans themselves. There have been numerous studies, many by the Army’s Human terrain teams, that prove how fluid that term is. There is no distinct tribal Hierarchy, at least not in living memory. Many Pashtuns, nevermind Afghans in general, have no idea what constitutes a tribe or if they even belong to one. Any attempt to configure such a framework, implies and Anbar-esque solution that simply is unattainable.
The Lashkar or tribal militias have terrible reputations, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They have never stopped a foreign invader(Brits, US, Soviets, or Pakistani Army) or policed their turfs well without praying on others. Which is why the locals dispise the very concept of their return. They at best are an Auxillary to government forces, not a substitute for them.
4)”not to mention that there will always be an opposition, ala Northern Alliance/Karzai Regime.” Again, what kind of opposition? An Armed one? This is doubtful. As I mentioned above, it is more then likely the Northerners will be conquered by Omar’s people, it nearly happened under Masood. If that should happen, then we would be worse then we were before 9/11.
5)”The Afghans in the other regions do benefit from Taliban shadow government in their areas due to the relative ethics of the governance and juducial system compared to that of Kabul.” This is partly true, the Taliban franchise offers very little, but what it offers it offers well. It doesn’t mean locals benefit from it(though it can) or submit to it willingly.
6)”But, one of the many problems in the Kabul federated experiment is the dynaimcs between Pashtuns and the other tribes. If given the opportunity, they will try their own hand at autonomy.” Again I’m not going to repeat myself over the tribes again. The problem is far less federation between Pashtuns and other ethnics. Its more between Kabul and everybody else, that includes other Pashtuns.
7)”Hekmatyar is playing both sides of the fence. His cooperation with the QST is reliant only on his self interest.” I completely agree and right now their interests align. They may not afterward but for now they do. Second he arguably is THE major character is the East. HIG has more control in Kunar and Nuristan then anyone else, and his fingerprints are popping up North too now.
8)”There may not be a Masood, but there will be opposition.” Its doubtful if it will last though.
9)” disagree. Not on the tech gap, but on the intelligence gap. We have come from a point where we knew virtually nothing about the adversary to a point where we know the majority of available ratlines and other infrastructure that I justifiably can’t get into on this forum.” Okay I’ll defer to you then but I’m sceptical. Frankly I will concede that we probably know much more now by a huge magnitude. Though I doubt that is enough without a reasonable strategy. I also believe we maybe mistaking better intel with omniscience.
10)”The ability to interdict in support of an embattled Kabul regime, without the necessity of drawing a vast majoirty of assets to force protection is hard to overstate.” Could not disagree more. Again we still need significant access to get resources there(like Aircraft). Then we need significant amounts of people just to continue a counterterrorism policy, thats not counting battling large enemy formations who will have overrun swaths of the country and we now have no hope of ejecting(how do you gather intel out of those AOs again?). Could we possibly safe guard Kabul? Maybe, but that would be it. It will never work.
11)”To AQs numbers in AFG. They mosrt surely rise and fall to some extent with the fighting season…” again I would say they are around a few thousand fighters.
“…the network builds and threat strem reporting don’t contradict the CIA assessment anywhere I have seen.” I can’t remember the CIA assement off the top of my head. Though I distinctly remember Director Panetta(along with Jones and Petreaus) spouting the nonsense of 100 fighters.
12)”Terror groups don’t need geographic safe areas to that extent.” To field small armies they do. If Al Qaeda wishs to be a Van Guard organisation then it does need a base of operation somewhere. Maybe not to commit small terror attacks but to field ground forces to overrun small nations they do.
13)”Foremost, though national sancturaies are nice, they are also vulnerable, as the lesson was learned.” I’d say we all ready knew that but I’ll meet you halfway. Vulnerable does not nessarily mean crushable, shut downable, or damagable, nevermind accessable. Afghanistan does not have a coastline like Somalia or Yemen, so going back to a earlier point, we need access.
14)” AQ has morphed into a franchise corporation with a rather mobile and internet based headquarters….” I agree but this entity has a torso or armed chest based still in Afghanistan or Pakistan. That franchise is the first among equals, the primogeniture, where the head resides.
15)”With our primary focus on the ‘Taliban’, we’re not taking the fight to al Qaeda.” Yes we are! Again they field a combined force.
16)” We’re, largely speaking, in a static defense in Afghanistan, absorbing blows from proxies and occaisonally AQ, to keep us interested.” I think you’ve wrong on both counts. In the East we’ve been in a slow retreat not defense since at least 09′ or so. That is mostly because of the lack fo manpower. We were origionally going to roll the forces Eastward after the South was pacified. That plan was torpedoed by the presidents withdrawal. We’re interested because we’re fighting there and people/political leaders want to know why things have gone awry. Then how to rectify the situation or who to blame.
17)”Meanwhile, we rely on unmanned strikes, which in locations where we have far less tactical knowledge, are a crapshoot.” the drone strikes are a tactic in the absence of a strategy, but its all we got. That crapshoot goes back to that whole intel issue and how do you collect such with no personel(or significant numbers). We will have a similiar situation in Afghanistan if we are defeated.
18)”I favor a dynamic strike capapbility to hit AQ and afiliates where they are, and where it hurst.” Again what does that mean? You can argue we have that situation right now in border of Pakistan. Is it working? No.
“That vision, as I see it, will take no small amount of strategic transformation in our intelligence, finance, cyber and military organizations.” Where to began here… suffice to say tell that to the president after we cut 800 Billion from DOD’s budget. Good Luck.
19)”If you argue that the Taliban matters to the overall fight against Islamic terrorism..” They matter that they are facilitators of Al Qaeda and fight alongside of them.
“…I think you’d have to also accept that AFG is only the top of a rather lengthy list of geographic places to occupy…” yes I would in the sense that it is the top of that list but no in that I think we have to nessarily occupy more areas(though I am reluctantly open to it).
20)”The trouble with the Afghanistan war is that right now we care too much about the chocolate.” Again you can’t separate the two. They fight side by side.
“You could make an argument that it’s worth caring about the chocolate because it’s better for us if the nougat goes uncovered. I found that compelling for a while, and to a degree still do.” So do I.
“But we’re eating too much chocolate in southern Afghanistan; it’s hurting us in eastern Afghanistan…” Again one doen’t directly impede the other see above.
“…and it pulls us too deeply into the machinations of Afghan governance, which is like eating the wrapper.” The big problem is we have never had the resources or feasible startegy until very recently and the administration is willing to depart before we can really impliment anything tangible.
21)”Plus we’re finding out something significant in the drone war. We can eat a lot of nougat without eating any chocolate. The problem there (and also in Afghanistan) is that we also destroy innocent peanuts, with which the Taliban and al-Qaida deliberately intermingle.”” I have no problem reexaming the drone war if something better comes to replace it. The problem is this puts us on a direct collision course with the Pakistani government which no one wants to actually challege in any meaningful way. Remember the Taliban is a creation of the ISI not the US, its their bastard. Their sponsorship of Al Qaeda is what brought us there. Pakistan should worry about offending us, not the other way around.
I think the underlying element in our disagreement will come down to how many AQ members we each believe to exist at any one time in AFG, and the strategic goal of their presenece there. We have a pretty good laydown of AQ numbers in country, and I don’t see anything that disagrees with my assessment.
For my part, I wish I could share things I cannot, not out of trying to change your mind, but out of a respect for your willingness to have a civil discussion in this subject…which is rather rare on the internet, outside of the serious wonk sites.
I don’t have the time presently to give your response the attention it deserves, partially becuase I would try hard not to simply retread the same ground, and partially because the outlaws are town for the holidays.
The kicker for me is that if the various Taliban elements withered and died tomorrow, it wouldn’t affect al Qaeda’s bottom line whatsoever. Thier main goal at this point re;AFG is to keep us engaged inextrcicably, while they remain generally safe and continue to build it’s franchise affiliates.
I don’t view AFG important to our national security except for reverberations in Pakistan…..but, and this is a major but, the underlying problems in Pakistan will not be solved without a regional security solution.
The major problem with ever seeing success in AFG is that we are willingly ignoring the primary tenet of COIN – a legitimate host government. Adding to that, if a concerted effort gained a semblance of security within the next decade, you’re looking at another two decades before AFG would be solvent and stable enough to fund it’s own security.
I do not wish to devote the majority effort of our military and intelligence apparatus, as well as untold billions of dollars, while virtually ignoring al Qaeda [comparatively speaking].
18#
1)” think the underlying element in our disagreement will come down to how many AQ members we each believe to exist at any one time in AFG, and the strategic goal of their presenece there. We have a pretty good laydown of AQ numbers in country, and I don’t see anything that disagrees with my assessment.” Check out the “long war Journal” and I think the “Captaim’s journal”(though admittingly haven’t been there in awhile) for contradiction.
2)”For my part, I wish I could share things I cannot, not out of trying to change your mind, but out of a respect for your willingness to have a civil discussion in this subject…which is rather rare on the internet, outside of the serious wonk sites.” You peeked my curiosity though, I thought you were a retired 11 series weren’t you? You were in the same 1st ID brigade as Bailey right?
I am willing to admit that you may know a bombshell that would alter my assessment. Frankly I doubt this, I come to this conclusion based on the many, and I mean many, failures just over the last 4-5 years in the war. This supposedly when we had our “eye on the ball” again in Afghanistan. That spans both administartions, not simply Obama’s. Thats why I said above “I also believe we maybe mistaking better intel with omniscience.”.
I atribute much of our failure to faulty assumptions, both military and civil. We have had earth shattering success down south in less then three years. That is after the Special Forces run shamble the first few years, which we turned over to the undermanned, poorly led, overextended besieged Brits. We lost Nuristan, which to be fair we were barely ever in. Then we had the whole Pech Valley fiasco, now also under enemy control, which we all but in name abandoned and have been retreating from since 09′. Kunar and Nuristan are almost entirely under enemy control. They are now used as jump off points West to Kabul, North to Kunduz and Mazar, and East into Pakistan.
One last point, our rational over the last year or so has been to turn provinces backover to the Afghans, whether they are capable enough to contest the enemy or not. Second as mentioned above there are areas in country that have never been cleared by us, its doubtful if the Aghans can take them back anytime soon.
3)”The kicker for me is that if the various Taliban elements withered and died tomorrow, it wouldn’t affect al Qaeda’s bottom line whatsoever.” Um, again arguable, if this happened in Pakistan they would be dead, on trial, or at the very least fleeing somwhere else, which is likely to be much more accessible to us.
“Thier main goal at this point re;AFG is to keep us engaged inextrcicably…” I don’t think they assume we’ll stay there for eternity. They are trying to deal a gradual death blow to us. They know if we lose there it would be much harder to contest their movements else where.
“, while they remain generally safe and continue to build it’s franchise affiliates.” this goes back to confronting the whole Pakistan again.
4)”…but, and this is a major but, the underlying problems in Pakistan will not be solved without a regional security solution.” I simply do not believe such a thing is attainable. There are simply to many conflicting interests to walk a tight-rope across to make that possible. Pakistan has been outwardly connected in one way or another with the conflicts spiraling around it, since its independence as a state. The only thing they seem to understand is fear.
5)”The major problem with ever seeing success in AFG is that we are willingly ignoring the primary tenet of COIN – a legitimate host government.” Thats the key, I agree. Karzai is at best a wild card in this endeavor. The one positive I would say going for us is the AFghan government has a low bar to overcome. It will never be able to defeat a foreign invader, collect taxes from a largely peasant population who don’t have much to tax, it will never be able to police large swaths of its countryside, and, it will always be dependent on money grants from others(as every modern government there has been). All it has to be, is the biggest boy on the block. Beat who ever is the biggest internal threat and for that it needs a small well recruited(not nessarily large) and trained force.
6)” do not wish to devote the majority effort of our military and intelligence apparatus, as well as untold billions of dollars, while virtually ignoring al Qaeda [comparatively speaking].” I’ve said before I wish you could reasonably separate the two, that is for all practical purposes impossible in the Af/Pak border, where ironically they are strongest.
Merry Christmas, if I don’t “converse” with you again before then.