{"id":73781,"date":"2017-08-04T08:30:10","date_gmt":"2017-08-04T12:30:10","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/valorguardians.com\/blog\/?p=73781"},"modified":"2017-08-04T10:58:58","modified_gmt":"2017-08-04T14:58:58","slug":"lets-play-the-f-35-acquisition-projection-game","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/?p=73781","title":{"rendered":"Some F-35 Acquisition Projections"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>A few days ago, Poetrooper <em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/?p=73684\">wrote an article concerning foreign sales for the F-35<\/a><\/em>.\u00a0 In preparing comments to that article, I did a bit of research on the aircraft\u2019s financials.<\/p>\n<p>The information I found was, to put it mildly, troubling.\u00a0 So I decided I\u2019d do a bit of \u201cwhat-if\u201d gaming to see what happens if reality intrudes on DoD\u2019s plans with respect to the F-35.<\/p>\n<p>The basic financials for the F-35 program <u>are not<\/u> pretty.\u00a0 Neither are the &#8220;what ifs&#8221;.\u00a0 In fact, both are damned scary.<\/p>\n<p>So I decided to write this article.\u00a0 I&#8217;ve tried to keep it as simple as possible, while still being as accurate as I can within the time I have available to chase facts.<\/p>\n<p>And no, PT &#8211; you&#8217;re <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">not<\/span> gonna like this article.<\/p>\n<p><strong>. . .<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>This article is structured into three parts.\u00a0 The first part is a description of some the information I\u2019ve found to date regarding F-35 financials, adjusted to 2017 dollars as necessary.\u00a0 The second part is a &#8220;quick and dirty&#8221; analysis of what happens to the F-35\u2019s unit and overall costs under several scenarios.\u00a0 The third part is my attempt to put things in perspective \u2013 to answer the \u201cSo what?\u201d question regarding the F-35.<\/p>\n<p>The article&#8217;s a bit long as it is.\u00a0 So I\u2019m not planning on presenting the details of my calculations in this article.\u00a0 If there\u2019s demand, I can edit the article to include a link to a \u201cprettied-up\u201d version of the spreadsheet I used to make the calculations.<\/p>\n<p><strong>. . . <\/strong><\/p>\n<p><u>Part I \u2013 Current F-35 Financials<\/u><\/p>\n<p>Wikipedia <em><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Lockheed_Martin_F-35_Lightning_II\">gives the following information<\/a><\/em> regarding the F-35 program financials, as of 2015.\u00a0 Though the immediate source is Wikipedia, their source was official program documentation from the F-35 PMO; I\u2019ll thus take it as legit.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>RDT&amp;E Costs (2015):\u00a0 $55.1 billion<\/li>\n<li>MILCON:\u00a0 $4.8 billion<\/li>\n<li>Procurement:\u00a0 $319.1 billion<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Now, this isn\u2019t the breakout we need for projections \u2013 we need Development Cost and Procurement Cost instead.\u00a0 And we shouldn\u2019t simply use the RDT&amp;E amount above as<br \/>\n&#8220;Development Cost&#8221; without first determining whether or not that&#8217;s even close to correct.\u00a0 Some portion of the RDT&amp;E costs will be spent during production for follow-up testing, and some portion of the procurement costs will have been spent during development.<\/p>\n<p>However, since those portions in question will each likely be small, we probably won\u2019t be too far off if we assume they balance each other.\u00a0 So if we consider the RDT&amp;E funding to be the F-35\u2019s development cost and the combination of MILCON and Procurement funding the F-35&#8217;s Procurement Cost, we shouldn&#8217;t be too far off.\u00a0 (The MILCON costs likely will go to setting up production and maintenance facilities associated with the aircraft, so they should fall under the Production Cost umbrella)\u00a0 Hey &#8211; this is a &#8220;quick and dirty&#8221; estimate; it&#8217;s not a detailed budget projection.<\/p>\n<p>If we do that, that gives us the following starting point numbers:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Est Development Cost (2015):\u00a0 $55.1 billion<\/li>\n<li>Est Procurement Cost (2015):\u00a0 $323.9 billion<\/li>\n<li>Total Est Program Acquisition Cost (2015):\u00a0 $379 billion<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Now, that\u2019s in 2015 dollars (duh).\u00a0 Converting to 2017 dollars ($1.00 in Jun 2015 had the purchasing power of $1.03 in Jun 2017, <a href=\"https:\/\/data.bls.gov\/cgi-bin\/cpicalc.pl\"><em>per the BLS CPI calculator<\/em><\/a>), based on those Wikipedia numbers we get the following:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Est Development Cost (2015, in 2017 dollars):\u00a0 $56.753 billion<\/li>\n<li>Est Procurement Cost (2015, in 2017 dollars):\u00a0 $333.617 billion<\/li>\n<li>Total Est Program Acquisition Cost (2015, in 2017 dollars):\u00a0 $390.37 billion<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>However, it turns out those 2015 costs are no longer current.\u00a0 The F-35 PMO <em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2017-07-10\/f-35-program-costs-jump-to-406-billion-in-new-pentagon-estimate\">publicly indicated last month<\/a><\/em> that updated financials for the F-35 are now available.\u00a0 Those new numbers indicate that the F-35&#8217;s Program Acquisition Cost has gone up to $406.5 billion in terms of 2017 dollars.<\/p>\n<p>That\u2019s an increase, in terms of 2017 dollars, of $16.13 billion since 2015.\u00a0 Since the F-35 PMO said that increase is split between RDT&amp;E, MILCON, and Procurement funding, I\u2019m going to assume the proportions of each in the increase are the same as they were in 2015. (They might not be in the same proportions, but since I don\u2019t know one way or another that assumption seems reasonable.)\u00a0 That yields the following<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Updated Est Development Cost (2017):\u00a0 $59.098 billion<\/li>\n<li>Updated Est Procurement Cost (2017):\u00a0 $347.402 billion<\/li>\n<li>Updated Total Est Program Acquisition Cost (2017):\u00a0 $406.5 billion<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Again:\u00a0 these financial numbers probably aren\u2019t exactly correct, but they\u2019re probably close enough to do reasonable \u201cwhat if\u201d games to see what happens to program and unit costs if Congress or DoD decides to start reducing quantities.\u00a0 Any errors should be reasonably small.<\/p>\n<p>The same Bloomberg article that gave the revised program costs seems to indicate a total planned production for the F-35 of 2,456 aircraft.\u00a0 This yields an average Program Acquisition Unit Cost for the F-35 of $165.5 million \u2013 or over twice that of the F\/A-18E\/F.\u00a0 And knowing the total number of F-35s projected to be produced is also the final piece of information we need to do reasonable \u201cwhat if\u201d games.<\/p>\n<p><u>What Happens If Quantities Are Reduced?<\/u><\/p>\n<p>Ok, the above are all based on the assumption that 2,456 F-35s will be produced.\u00a0 So, what happens if the numbers to be built get cut?\u00a0 Based on past DoD procurement history over the last 2 decades, we know that&#8217;s pretty damned likely.<\/p>\n<p>In broad terms, we already have a good idea of what should happen.\u00a0 The overall Program Acquisition Cost will drop &#8211; but the unit cost will rise.\u00a0 But by how much in each case?<\/p>\n<p>To figure that, we need to make some assumptions about the average flyaway cost of the F-35.\u00a0 And we have the info to make some reasonable guesses about that, though we don\u2019t have the details.<\/p>\n<p>The F-35 is expected to enter production in FY2018.\u00a0 The PM has indicated he is confident he can make his flyaway cost target of about $85 million each for the F-35 in 2019 and (presumably) beyond.<\/p>\n<p>We don\u2019t know what the add-ons to the flyaway cost will be needed to yield procurement cost will be.\u00a0 But I can\u2019t see them being more than about 5% of flyaway cost, so I\u2019ll use that as a worst-case figure.<\/p>\n<p>Further, the flyaway cost tends to drop over time as I\u2019ve discussed in an earlier article.\u00a0 So the average flyaway cost of the last 1500 or so F-35s to be produced (231 have already been built) will likely be less than the 2019 figure.\u00a0 How much less?\u00a0 Dunno.<\/p>\n<p>Further, the F-35B and C models cost more.\u00a0 I don\u2019t have current figures for the flyaway costs of the B and C models, but most to be produced are the A model \u2013 so I\u2019m going to assume it all comes out to a single figure \u201cin the wash\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>So for this part, I\u2019m going to use 3 assumptions for flyaway cost of the items cut:\u00a0 $85m average (the target cost for FY2019), $75M average (assumes the flyaway cost goes down substantially before we start cutting quantities), and $65M average (since that\u2019s a nearly 25% reduction, this IMO essentially assumes the proverbial \u201c. . . and a miracle occurs\u201d).\u00a0 I\u2019m also going to assume the estimated Program Acquisition Cost of $406.5 billion is dead on target.<\/p>\n<p><em><u>Case 1<\/u>:\u00a0 Constant Flyaway Cost from FY2019 On<\/em><\/p>\n<p>This scenario is probably not terribly reasonable, as production costs tend to go down over time and I\u2019m guessing the PMO is probably counting on that.\u00a0 Nonetheless, it gives a good starting point.\u00a0 That starting point is:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Program Acquisition Cost:\u00a0 $406.5 billion<\/li>\n<li>Total Produced:\u00a0 2,456<\/li>\n<li>Unit Acquisition Cost:\u00a0 $165.5 million<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>But what happens if either Congress or DoD cuts production?\u00a0 After all:\u00a0 recent history says that\u2019s rather likely.<\/p>\n<p>Specifically, what happens if DoD or Congress says, \u201cNope \u2013 can\u2019t afford those last 1,000.\u00a0 Airforce, Navy, USMC:\u00a0 you guys figure out how to split the 1,456 we actually will buy.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Now, as noted above the unit cost for the F-35B and C models is higher, so the mix will affect the overall average.\u00a0 But I\u2019m not going to attempt to deal with those complications on a quick-look analysis like this article.<\/p>\n<p>Anyway, here\u2019s the impact, assuming a \u201csalami-slice\u201d cut (everyone gets an equal % reduction), based on an average flyaway cost of $85M per F-35 cut:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Program Acquisition Cost, 1456 total aircraft:\u00a0 $317.25 billion<\/li>\n<li>Unit Acquisition Cost:\u00a0 $217.891 million<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Yep \u2013 the overall program\u2019s acquisition cost goes down by $89+ billion.\u00a0 But while the Program Acquisition Cost goes down, the unit cost for the aircraft goes up by $52+ million.\u00a0 Why?\u00a0 Because that $59+ billion in development costs (and the MILCON) are now spread over fewer items.<\/p>\n<p>So, what happens if we only end up producing, say, 1000?\u00a0 Here ya go:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Program Acquisition Cost, 1000 total aircraft:\u00a0 $276.552 billion<\/li>\n<li>Unit Acquisition Cost:\u00a0 $276.552 million<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Yep, the trend continues.\u00a0 Program cost went down more \u2013 this time by nearly $130 billion.\u00a0 But the unit cost for the bird has now grown by over $100M with respect to the original plan.<\/p>\n<p>Those numbers were ugly enough (in terms of unit cost) that I didn\u2019t bother to run the 750 or 500 total production scenarios.<\/p>\n<p>And believe it or not, it gets worse.<\/p>\n<p><em><u>Case 2<\/u>:\u00a0 Flyaway Cost Reduced Moderately During Production<\/em><\/p>\n<p>I regard this as the most reasonable scenario.\u00a0 Here, I project that we learn enough during the first 1000 F-35s produced that we can reduce the average flyaway cost from that point forward to $75M per aircraft.\u00a0 I\u2019m guessing I\u2019m guessing the PMO is probably counting on something along those lines, though maybe not that exact amount.\u00a0 I\u2019m also assuming here that the $406.5 billion Program Acquisition Cost figure from the PMO released last month remains accurate.<\/p>\n<p>Here, there&#8217;s no impact if all 2,456 are built.\u00a0 In that case, unit and total costs remain the same &#8211; $165.5M and $406.5B, respectively.<\/p>\n<p>But that&#8217;s not the case if DoD or Congress says, \u201cNope \u2013 can\u2019t afford all of that.\u00a0 Reduce the number produced.\u201d\u00a0 For a reduction to 1456 total aircraft, here\u2019s what we get.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Program Acquisition Cost, 1456 total aircraft:\u00a0 $327.75 billion<\/li>\n<li>Unit Acquisition Cost: \u00a0$225.103 million<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Huh?\u00a0 Wait a minute.\u00a0 Both the program\u2019s Acquisition Cost and the Unit Cost went <em>UP<\/em> with respect to the previous case?<\/p>\n<p>Yes, they did.\u00a0 We removed the 1000 lowest-cost items produced \u2013 which cost less each than in the previous case.\u00a0 Since we assume the total program cost of $406.5 billion is unchanged, that means the costs under this scenario were perforce proportionally more \u201cfront-loaded\u201d.\u00a0 The net effect is that we saved less overall (and ended up with an even higher unit cost to boot) by cutting the same number of items.<\/p>\n<p>It\u2019s even uglier if production is cut to 1000 total:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Program Acquisition Cost, 1000 total aircraft:\u00a0 $291.840 billion<\/li>\n<li>Unit Acquisition Cost: \u00a0$291.84 million<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Under this scenario, we\u2019re approaching a unit cost of $300M per aircraft.<\/p>\n<p><em><u>Case 3<\/u>:\u00a0 Flyaway Cost Reduced Substantially During Production<\/em><\/p>\n<p>I regard this as the least reasonable scenario.\u00a0 Here, I project that we learn enough during production of the first 1000 F-35s that we could reduce the average flyaway cost from that point forward to $65M per aircraft, but that the $406.5 billion Program Acquisition Cost figure from the PMO released last month and remains accurate.\u00a0 I don\u2019t think we\u2019ll see this happen, but you never know.<\/p>\n<p>As before, there&#8217;s no impact if all 2,456 are built.\u00a0 In that case, unit and total costs remain the same as in the other two cases.<\/p>\n<p>Now, what happens if DoD or Congress says, \u201cNope \u2013 can\u2019t afford that.\u00a0 Reduce the number produced.\u201d\u00a0 For a reduction to 1456 total aircraft, here\u2019s what we get.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Program Acquisition Cost, 1456 total aircraft:\u00a0 $338.35 billion<\/li>\n<li>Unit Acquisition Cost: \u00a0$232.314+ million<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Just like before, both Program Acquisition Cost and the Unit Cost went UP with respect to the previous case.\u00a0 As before, we removed the 1000 lowest-cost items produced \u2013 but this time, what we removed cost even less than before. \u00a0So what we saw before in terms of rising program and unit costs got more extreme.<\/p>\n<p>It\u2019s even uglier under this case if production is cut to 1000 total:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Program Acquisition Cost, 1000 total aircraft:\u00a0 $307.128 billion<\/li>\n<li>Unit Acquisition Cost: \u00a0$307.128 million<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>There ya go.\u00a0 Under this scenario, we now have a single-seat fighter aircraft that cost Uncle Sam <strong><em>$300+M each<\/em><\/strong>.\u00a0 Isn&#8217;t that just dandy?<\/p>\n<p><u>Some Perspective, AKA the \u201cSo What?\u201d<\/u><\/p>\n<p>So, what does all this mean?\u00a0 Well, I\u2019ve got a couple of thoughts along those lines.<\/p>\n<p>First:\u00a0 the F-35 has been termed the most expensive weapon system ever.\u00a0 That\u2019s accurate.\u00a0 We\u2019re talking $406.5 billion <em>just to buy it.<\/em>\u00a0 Operating and maintaining over its anticipated life span it will cost nearly 3x that (current estimate is somewhere around $1.1 trillion).<\/p>\n<p>To put that in perspective, I&#8217;ve seen various estimates for the cost of procuring a carrier battle group (CBG) &#8211; including both ships and aircraft &#8211; ranging from $20 billion to $40 billion.\u00a0 Assuming a CBG procurement cost of $30 billion on average (CBGs vary in size, and $30 billion is the midpoint of the range), that means we\u2019re planning to spend enough on the F-35 alone <em>to replace all 10 existing Navy carrier battle groups \u2013 <u>plus buy 3 additional CBGs, and still have $16.5 billion left over<\/u><\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>Even at the higher end of estimated CBG cost ($40 billion), we&#8217;re still talking enough to replace all 10 Navy CBGs.\u00a0 And that still leaves <em>$6.5 billion<\/em> to &#8220;play with&#8221;.<\/p>\n<p>That matters because we&#8217;ll need other new things too over the next 3 decades.\u00a0 Obviously, F-35 is hardly the only new weapons system we need to develop during the next couple of decades.\u00a0 Hell, it\u2019s hardly the only new aircraft the <em>USAF<\/em> will need over the next 25+ years \u2013 which is how long the F-35 is projected to be in production (until 2044).\u00a0 But if we&#8217;re going to spend $400+ billion on it . . . where do we get the $$$ for the others?<\/p>\n<p>The F-35 may end up being a great aircraft.\u00a0 Or it might not be.\u00a0 But it doesn\u2019t matter how damn good it is <em>if we can\u2019t afford to procure enough of them to do the job &#8211; or if buying it means the rest of DoD is left Bravo Delta due to lack of money to train\/operate\/maintain, or due to obsolete equipment because we can&#8217;t afford to buy anything else new.<\/em><\/p>\n<p>I just don\u2019t see how we can afford it.\u00a0 Not if we&#8217;re going to have enough funding left to buy the other new stuff we need, plus train\/operate\/maintain.<\/p>\n<p>Second:\u00a0 consider what this could do in terms of forcing leadership to be more risk-adverse.\u00a0 (Arguably, we\u2019re already too risk-adverse as it is.)\u00a0 Let\u2019s say the unit cost of a F-35 ends up being around $200M after all is said and done.\u00a0 That could very easily happen if quantities procured fall significantly short of what\u2019s projected today, and it&#8217;s my guess that it indeed will.\u00a0 Remember:\u00a0 <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">best-case<\/span>, they&#8217;re going to cost around $165M each anyway &#8211; and that&#8217;s only if we build all 2,450+ of them that are currently planned.\u00a0 Build fewer, and the unit cost goes up.<\/p>\n<p>A typical squadron has between 12 and 24 aircraft.\u00a0 Let\u2019s say the average is 18.\u00a0 That means a squadron commander now \u201cowns\u201d aircraft worth $3.6 billion dollars.\u00a0 A wing commander will own probably 3 or 4 times that much in terms of aircraft cost.\u00a0 Wow, that\u2019s gonna look <u>great<\/u> on their OERs!<\/p>\n<p>Well, it certainly will \u2013 unless something happens to one of those aircraft due to an accident, bad maintenance, or even wartime losses. Then . . . who\u2019s gonna be blamed?<\/p>\n<p>Now I\u2019m not an aviator.\u00a0 But last time I checked, the entire chain-of-command sometimes felt the pain of one dumbass decision (or honest mistake) by a relatively junior troop.\u00a0 How\u2019s that gonna play out for the chain-of-command when some wannabe sh!t-hot young and inexperienced fighter jock crashes a $200M aircraft by doing something foolish or reckless? \u00a0Or cuts a maneuver too close, and gets into a midair \u2013 and takes out $400M worth of Uncle Sam\u2019s property?\u00a0 Or when a maintainer misses something, and $200M ends up a &#8220;smoking hole&#8221; as a result?<\/p>\n<p>My guess is that it will be seriously bad news for both his squadron and wing commanders &#8211; hell, I think something like that already is bad news for the entire chain-of-command.\u00a0 But I\u2019d guess it will be far worse for the chain-of-command than it is today when the financial loss of such an incident is $200M (or $400M or more).\u00a0 And I\u2019m guessing that because of this possibility, a risk-adverse attitude (&#8220;Don\u2019t take any chances with your equipment!&#8221;) will filter down to their subordinates, too &#8211; including their maintainers, who will find themselves being even more &#8220;under the gun&#8221; regarding aircraft maintenance than they are today.<\/p>\n<p>That\u2019s not necessarily a good thing.\u00a0 We don\u2019t need timid or risk-adverse military leaders leading troops in combat any more than we need reckless fools doing the same.\u00a0 Either can be a prescription for disaster.<\/p>\n<p><strong>. . .<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>As I said, I\u2019m no aviator.\u00a0 I could be wrong above.\u00a0 But it seems to me that this bird is simply not affordable \u2013 even it ever it works as proponents claim it will &#8220;real soon now&#8221; in all respects.\u00a0 And based on what I\u2019ve seen to date, I\u2019m damned pessimistic about it ever working &#8220;100% as advertised&#8221;.<\/p>\n<p>I think we need to cut our losses here, and go back to the drawing board.<\/p>\n<p>Any weapon system has to be affordable enough to buy in the first place &#8211; and to risk losing it while training or in combat.\u00a0 Otherwise, it&#8217;s nothing but a wet dream made real for developers and manufacturers that&#8217;s of little military utility.<\/p>\n<p>I just don&#8217;t think we can afford this one &#8211; no matter how good it eventually may be.\u00a0 It&#8217;s not the only new system DoD will need over the next 25 years.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><em>(<span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">Addendum<\/span>:\u00a0 for what it&#8217;s worth, assuming we&#8217;ve spent roughly 85% of the development cost of the F-35, or about $50 billion, so far<\/em> &#8211; <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Lockheed_Martin_F-35_Lightning_II_procurement\">per this Wikipedia article<\/a><em> it appears that we&#8217;ve already spent roughly $96 billion on developing and procuring the F-35 through 2016.\u00a0 [Spending for the F-35 for 2017 doesn&#8217;t seem to be available there.]\u00a0 For production to date of 231 F-35s of all types, that works out to an average unit acquisition cost of around $415.4 million as of this year.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>And costs for the system continue to rise above projections as time goes by.)<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>A few days ago, Poetrooper wrote an article concerning foreign sales for the F-35.\u00a0 In preparing &hellip; <a title=\"Some F-35 Acquisition Projections\" class=\"hm-read-more\" href=\"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/?p=73781\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Some F-35 Acquisition Projections<\/span>Read more<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":623,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[84],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-73781","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-military-issues"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73781","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/623"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=73781"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73781\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=73781"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=73781"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=73781"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}