DPAA did not announce the accounting for of any US personnel this week.\u00a0 So instead, today you’re getting yet another “walkabout” ramble \u2013 this time, on a historical topic.<\/p>\n
Consider yourself forewarned.\u00a0 (smile)<\/p>\n
. . .<\/strong><\/p>\n The Cold War produced many crises.\u00a0 But the most serious \u2013 and most dangerous \u2013 of them was the Cuban Missile Crisis.<\/p>\n What follows concerns one specific incident during the Cuban Missile Crisis that was unknown in the West for nearly four decades.\u00a0 Had it turned out differently, the planet would be a far different place today.<\/p>\n . . .<\/strong><\/p>\n On 1 October 1962, a small flotilla of four Soviet diesel-electric submarines departed their base on the Kola Peninsula.\u00a0 Their departure was in support of Operation Anadyr<\/em><\/a>\u00a0 \u2013 the Soviet operation to install MRBMs (R-12\/SS-4<\/em><\/a>), IRBMs (R-14\/SS-5<\/em><\/a>), associated other weaponry, and position up to 60,000 Soviet troops in Cuba unobserved.\u00a0 The operation had begun some weeks earlier.<\/p>\n Operation Anadyr’s<\/em> strategic objective was to protect Cuba from a US invasion; a secondary benefit would be to greatly increase the number of deliverable Soviet nuclear warheads that could be used reliably to target the US.\u00a0 (The so-called \u201cmissile gap\u201d of 1960 election fame indeed existed, but it was the Soviets \u2013 not the US \u2013 who were holding the short straw.\u00a0 If successful, Operation Anadyr<\/em> would roughly double the number of reliably deliverable Soviet warheads targeting the US.)<\/p>\n The submarines in this Soviet flotilla deployed in support of a secondary operation that was simultaneously part of Operation Anadyr<\/em> \u2013 Operation Kama<\/em>.\u00a0 This subsidiary operation would have stationed seven Soviet ballistic missile submarines at Mariel, Cuba.<\/p>\n The deployment of the 4 submarines on 1 October 1962 did not include any ballistic missile submarines.\u00a0 The submarines comprising the flotilla \u2013 B-4, B-36, B-59, and B-130, with B-59 serving as the flotilla\u2019s flagship \u2013 were Foxtrot-class diesel-electric attack submarines.\u00a0 They were being deployed to clear the way for the planned deployment of ballistic missile subs.<\/p>\n Fortunately (or unfortunately, from the Soviet perspective), Operation Anadyr<\/em> was discovered prematurely by US intelligence.\u00a0 Some evidence of Soviet activities was discovered during September 1962 while equipment was en route to Cuba by US intelligence assets.\u00a0 But partially complete missile installations were not discovered until a US U-2 overflight of Cuba on 14 October 1962.<\/p>\n The latter discovery tipped off the US government that something serious was going on in Cuba regarding Soviet nuclear forces.\u00a0 The result was the Cuban Missile Crisis.<\/p>\n The secondary Operation Kama<\/em> also failed.\u00a0 All four of the subs in the deploying flotilla were detected while transiting the Sargasso Sea, and were tailed by US naval assets.\u00a0 Three of the four were eventually forced to surface by the US Navy.\u00a0 Only B-4, which the US Navy attempted to force to surface shortly after it had fully recharged its batteries, was able to evade and escape without being forced to surface under the guns of US Navy warships.<\/p>\n During the pursuit of these submarines, the world likely came closer to a general nuclear war than ever before or since.<\/p>\n . . .<\/strong><\/p>\n Unknown to US intelligence,\u00a0 warheads associated with the MRBM and IRBM installations in Cuba detected by US overflights were not<\/span> the only nuclear weapons on Cuba at the time.\u00a0 Along with MRBMs and IRBMs, the Soviets had clandestinely deployed short range missiles (both FKR-1<\/em><\/a> and Luna, AKA FROG<\/em><\/a>, missiles) with nuclear warheads to Cuba.\u00a0 They had also deployed a small number of tactical nuclear bombs suitable for delivery by jet aircraft.<\/p>\n Additionally \u2013 and also unknown to the US at the time \u2013 \u00a0each of the Soviet submarines in the Operation Kama<\/em> flotilla was equipped with one nuclear torpedo.\u00a0 The warhead on that torpedo was the RDS-9; it had a yield of between 3 and 10 kilotons.<\/p>\n Moscow retained release authority over the nuclear weapons based in Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis.\u00a0 But under certain selected circumstances, the Soviet submarine captains of the four submarines deployed in Operation Kama<\/em> were authorized to use their nuclear torpedo without first obtaining permission from Moscow.<\/p>\n . . .<\/strong><\/p>\n The danger point came on 27 October 1962 \u2013 termed \u201cBlack Saturday\u201d of the Cuban Missile Crisis.<\/p>\n The \u201cpucker factor\u201d at the beginning of the day was already extreme.\u00a0 The crisis had been ongoing for over almost 2 weeks; nerves on both sides were hugely frayed.\u00a0 The entire crisis was nearing resolution, one way or another:\u00a0 US forces were scheduled to invade within a few days (3 at most) if last-ditch diplomatic efforts failed.\u00a0 And on that day, several incidents occurred that ratcheted tensions up even higher:<\/p>\n . . .<\/strong><\/p>\n Soviet submarine procedure of the day required daily contact with Soviet military authorities by all submarines.\u00a0 However, the prescribed time for contact with higher HQ was also apparently rigidly fixed.\u00a0 And on 27 October 1962, Soviet submarine B-59 \u2013 due to US surveillance \u2013 had not been able to make contact with higher HQ for one or more days.<\/p>\n The boat was also in bad shape.\u00a0 HVAC was inoperative, so the boat had become dangerously hot.\u00a0 Carbon dioxide levels were extreme.\u00a0 Due to US pursuit, they\u2019d also been unable to completely charge batteries for some time; battery levels were thus extremely low.<\/p>\n They\u2019d been able to periodically monitor US radio broadcasts, so they knew the Cuban Missile Crisis was both ongoing and worsening.\u00a0 But without contact with higher HQ, they didn\u2019t know if hostilities had broken out between the US and USSR.<\/p>\n It was at this point that US naval assets attempted to force B-59 to surface.\u00a0 They closed in and began dropping practice depth charges in the immediate vicinity of the boat.<\/p>\n These charges were nonlethal, having roughly the explosive power of a hand-grenade.\u00a0 The US had informed the Soviet government earlier that use of these devices was intended to signal submarines in the \u201cnaval quarantine\u201d area to surface immediately.\u00a0 But since B-59 had been out of contact, they\u2019d not received this word.\u00a0 (It\u2019s unclear if the Soviet Navy advised any<\/em> of the submarines in the flotilla of this information from the US, as it appears this information may never have been passed to Soviet Naval HQ.)<\/p>\n At this point, B-59\u2019s commander had had enough.\u00a0 He decided to use his nuclear torpedo to destroy his attackers, notwithstanding the fact that his boat would simultaneously \u201cgo out with a bang\u201d as well.<\/p>\n He approached his boat\u2019s political officer, whose agreement was necessary under then-current Soviet Navy procedure to use the weapon under such circumstances.\u00a0 The political officer agreed.<\/p>\n Normaly this would have been enough.\u00a0 Under Soviet Navy procedures then in effect, agreement by the ship\u2019s captain and political officer was sufficient under dire circumstances for a Soviet submarine captain to use an onboard nuclear torpedo.<\/p>\n\n