{"id":38799,"date":"2013-12-10T12:35:19","date_gmt":"2013-12-10T17:35:19","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/valorguardians.com\/blog\/?p=38799"},"modified":"2015-03-16T15:39:51","modified_gmt":"2015-03-16T19:39:51","slug":"to-be-or-to-do","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/?p=38799","title":{"rendered":"To Be . . . Or To Do?"},"content":{"rendered":"<blockquote><p><i>\u201cTiger, one day you will come to a fork in the road and you\u2019re going to have to make a decision about which direction you want to go.\u201d (He raised his hand and pointed.) \u201cIf you go that way you can be somebody. You will have to make compromises and you will have to turn your back on your friends. But you will be a member of the club and you will get promoted and you will get good assignments.\u201d (Then [he] raised his other hand and pointed in another direction.) \u201cOr you can go that way and you can do something &#8211; something for your country and for your Air Force and for yourself. If you decide you want to do something, you may not get promoted and you may not get the good assignments and you certainly will not be a favorite of your superiors. But you won\u2019t have to compromise yourself. You will be true to your friends and to yourself. And your work might make a difference. To be somebody or to do something. In life there is often a roll call. That\u2019s when you will have to make a decision. To be or to do? Which way will you go?\u201d<\/i><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Many military theorists are well-known, at least within the military community.\u00a0 Jomini and Clausewitz, Mitchell and Douhet, Mahan &#8211; these names are remembered, in some cases centuries after their deaths.<\/p>\n<p>Yet others have been incredibly influential \u2013 and remain virtually unknown.\u00a0 This article concerns one of those influential unknowns.\u00a0 The lead quote above is his.<\/p>\n<p>The individual\u2019s accomplishments are varied \u2013 and are insanely impressive.\u00a0 He is credited with:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Being perhaps the single best air-to-air dogfighter in USAF history;<\/li>\n<li>Literally personally writing the \u201cbook\u201d for jet air-to-air combat for the USAF;<\/li>\n<li>With one other person, developing a major theory of aircraft performance in air-to-air combat;<\/li>\n<li>Being partially responsible for the superior performance of one of the USAF\u2019s primary air platforms;<\/li>\n<li>Being largely responsible for the very existence of a second, highly successful USAF primary air platform; a successful US Navy air platform; and indirectly responsible for a third successful USAF air platform;<\/li>\n<li>The development of an acclaimed major theory describing both individual and organizational behavior;<\/li>\n<li>Being the root cause for major changes in a sister-service\u2019s current warfighting doctrine; and<\/li>\n<li>Being a major contributor to (some have gone so far as to call him one of the architects of) the winning strategy of one US war &#8211; and some would say, of two.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Yet his combat service was very brief.\u00a0 He was not well-liked by many during his lifetime.\u00a0 He was far more interested in doing something worthwhile than recognition.\u00a0 He published precious little in open literature for posterity.\u00a0 And because of these (and other) factors, as I noted above there\u2019s a good chance you\u2019ve never heard of him.\u00a0 Indeed, even today he\u2019s yet to receive full recognition in own parent service.<\/p>\n<p>That, ladies and gentlemen, is a damned shame.\u00a0 Because this individual &#8211; though not particularly well-known &#8211; may well be the most influential military theorist of the last half of the 20th Century.<\/p>\n<p>His name was Col. John Richard Boyd, USAF.\u00a0 Within his own service, he was somewhat of a pariah.<br \/>\n<!--more--><\/p>\n<p><center><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"http:\/\/www.aviation-history.com\/airmen\/boyd56.jpg\" alt=\"\" \/><\/center>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">Early Career<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Boyd was born in Erie, PA, in 1927.\u00a0 During World War II, he enlisted in the Army Air Corps.\u00a0 He did not see combat; he served from 1945-1947, much of the time in occupied Japan.\u00a0 Even then, he was willing to tilt at windmills.\u00a0 Boyd ended up being <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dnipogo.org\/fcs\/comments\/c199.htm\">court-martialed for \u201cdestruction of government property\u201d<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>In\u00a0 a foreshadowing of things to come, Boyd \u201cbeat the rap\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>After his discharge, he attended college at the University of Iowa, receiving a degree in economics.\u00a0 He was commissioned in the USAF in 1951, and became a fighter pilot.<\/p>\n<p>He served in Korea 1953 \u2013 a short tour, flying only 22 of the standard 100 combat missions as wingman.\u00a0 Most sources indicated he never fired his plane\u2019s weapons or achieved an air-to-air kill.\u00a0 (<a href=\"http:\/\/www.sci.fi\/%7Efta\/JohnBoyd.htm\">One source<\/a> credits Boyd with damaging an enemy aircraft during a mission north of the Yalu River, but that is suspect and conflicts with many others.)<\/p>\n<p>On return from Korea, Boyd was assigned to USAF Fighter Weapons School as a student.\u00a0 After he graduated, the USAF opted to keep him there as an instructor.<\/p>\n<p>Whether by accident or design, this choice was to have major impact on the US Department of Defense for the next four decades and beyond.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">Forty-Second Boyd<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Boyd quickly became one of preeminent fighter &#8220;jocks&#8221; of his time &#8211; and most would say <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">the<\/span> preeminent fighter &#8220;jock&#8221;.\u00a0 He became so proficient that he had a <a href=\"http:\/\/www.sci.fi\/%7Efta\/JohnBoyd.htm\">standing bet with all comers<\/a>:\u00a0 starting with his opponent on his tail, he would \u201creverse the tables\u201d within 40 seconds and be in a position to shoot them down.\u00a0 The bet was for $40 \u2013 a considerable sum in the 1950s.\u00a0 This led to the first of what would be one of many nicknames Boyd acquired over the years:\u00a0 \u201cForty-Second Boyd\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>I\u2019ve not been able to determine just how many people challenged Boyd over the years; that number may not be accurately recorded anywhere.\u00a0 But I have been able to determine how many were successful.<\/p>\n<p>All accounts agree that the number of successful \u201ctakers\u201d of Boyd&#8217;s bet was<strong> <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">zero<\/span><\/strong> while Boyd was at AWS.\u00a0 Boyd never lost that bet.<\/p>\n<p>However, being a \u201csh!t-hot\u201d fighter pilot was only the beginning.\u00a0 If that was all Boyd did, I\u2019d not be writing this article.<\/p>\n<p>Boyd distilled and documented his thoughts on fighter tactics for posterity while at AWS.\u00a0 He literally personally wrote the first USAF fighter tactics manual, the <i><a href=\"http:\/\/www.ausairpower.net\/JRB\/boydaerialattack.pdf\">Aerial Attack Study<\/a><\/i>.\u00a0 This work \u2013 apparently for the first time anywhere \u2013 enumerated, described, and documented the maneuvers and tactics used in jet air-to-air combat.\u00a0 The document was not only groundbreaking; it was also comprehensive.\u00a0 Reportedly no new maneuvers have been added to those contained in Boyd\u2019s original work since it was first published by the USAF in the early 1960s.\u00a0 It now forms the tactical basis for air combat worldwide.<\/p>\n<p>This was at best probably Boyd\u2019s <em>fourth<\/em>-most important contribution to military theory and US security.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">Energy-Maneuverability Theory<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Boyd\u2019s experiences at AWS led him to believe he could further formalize his air-to-air combat insights and develop a quantitative theory of air-to-air combat.\u00a0 However, he also knew that his education (economics) didn\u2019t give him the proper background to discern and formalize such a theory.\u00a0 So in his 30s he went back to school, and got a 2<sup>nd<\/sup> degree \u2013 a BS in industrial engineering at Georgia Tech.<\/p>\n<p>While at Georgia Tech, his academic study led to the insights that would later become his <i>second<\/i> most important contribution to military theory:\u00a0 Energy-Maneuverability (E-M) Theory of aircraft.\u00a0 This theory held that an aircraft\u2019s air-to-air combat performance is determined largely by energy management considerations.\u00a0 Its basic equation is:<\/p>\n<p><center><br \/>\n<img decoding=\"async\" src=\"http:\/\/theblogczar.files.wordpress.com\/2011\/01\/e-m-theory-equation.jpg?w=300&amp;h=154\" alt=\"\" \/><\/center>Where<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px;\">Ps \u2013 specific energy<br \/>\nW \u2013 Weight<br \/>\nD \u2013 Drag<br \/>\nT \u2013 Thrust<br \/>\nV \u2013 Velocity<\/p>\n<p>The theory&#8217;s thesis is that the aircraft that can retain more energy while maneuvering &#8211; and which can change energy states more quickly &#8211; will be superior.\u00a0 (There were other aspects of the theory, most dealing with the implications of energy changes on aircraft structure &#8211; e.g., wing loading.\u00a0 But this single equation is the basis for the theory.)<\/p>\n<p>Like most successful theories, E-M Theory is both elegant and simple \u2013 and accurately describes known reality.<\/p>\n<p>Boyd\u2019s follow-on assignment after Georgia Tech was to Air Force Systems Command at Eglin AFB.\u00a0 There, he continued work on E-M Theory with a USAF civilian mathematician, <a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Thomas_P._Christie\">Thomas Christie<\/a>.\u00a0 (Christie was later to serve in a variety of senior Pentagon positions, culminating in Director, Defense Test and Evaluation, from 2001-2005).\u00a0 Christie was convinced of the validity of Boyd\u2019s theories, and assisted Boyd by clandestinely diverting computer time to provide computational assessments of various US and threat aircraft.\u00a0 (Reputedly Boyd was being considered for court-martial for \u201ctheft\u201d of around $1M in computer time at one point \u2013 until the value of his work was recognized.)<\/p>\n<p>These results by Boyd and Christie formalized and validated E-M theory. \u00a0The theory answered the questions of how to predict overall aircraft effectiveness in air-to-air combat, and how to quantify that prediction.\u00a0 In short, the theory gave designers a model of how to design aircraft with superior dogfight performance that actually worked.<\/p>\n<p>Had Boyd done nothing else in his career, E-M theory alone would have ensured his place in military history.\u00a0 However, Boyd was far from finished regarding his contributions to military theory and practice.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">Godfather to an Eagle, Falcon, and Hornet \u2013 and Great Uncle to a Warthog<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Boyd soon received orders for Okinawa.\u00a0 He didn&#8217;t serve there.<\/p>\n<p>Boyd and Christie\u2019s work had pointed out a serious problem for the US.\u00a0 According to E-M Theory, Soviet fighter aircraft of the early 1960s virtually across-the-board were better in a dogfight than US aircraft. Early air-to-air results from Vietnam seemed to confirm this.<\/p>\n<p>US doctrine was based on beyond visual range engagement.\u00a0 However, the ROE in Vietnam didn&#8217;t allow that.\u00a0 And in any case, US air-to-air missiles of the era \u2013 which would allow engagement beyond visual range \u2013 were pretty lousy anyway.<\/p>\n<p>And the next generation of US aircraft under design weren&#8217;t really much if any better.<\/p>\n<p>Boyd&#8217;s orders for Vietnam were cancelled.\u00a0 He was reassigned to the Pentagon to work on the USAF\u2019s next-generation fighter program, the F-X \u2013 which would become today\u2019s F-15.<\/p>\n<p>The program was in serious trouble.<\/p>\n<p>The initial design for the F-X was similar to the F-111:\u00a0 large, heavy, &#8220;swing-wing&#8221;, and twin-engine.\u00a0 Boyd\u2019s work on E-M Theory showed it would be ineffective in a dogfight.\u00a0 Boyd was instrumental in making extensive design changes to the F-X (though not as extensive as he would have liked \u2013 he still considered the resulting F-15 too big, heavy, and insufficiently agile in a dogfight).<\/p>\n<p>So as he did while validating E-M theory, Boyd did another end-run around USAF bureaucracy.\u00a0 He was instrumental in beginning what later became the lightweight fighter program \u2013 a program which spawned both the F-16 and F\/A-18, both of which were designed more closely to his liking.\u00a0 Additionally, an associate (some would call him an acolyte) of Boyd\u2019s \u2013 <a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Pierre_Sprey\">Pierre Sprey<\/a> \u2013 used Boyd\u2019s principles to guide the design of the USAF A-10.<\/p>\n<p>Boyd&#8217;s contributions to the designs of the F-15, F-16, F\/A-18, and (indirectly) A-10 collectively form an incredibly important contribution to US security.\u00a0 His efforts were instrumental in providing the US its front-line combat fighter and attack aircraft from the 1970s until today.\u00a0 All are highly successful airframes.<\/p>\n<p>But IMO, as important and long-lived as this contribution was &#8211; even this is neither Boyd\u2019s most enduring nor his most important contribution.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">The Boyd Cycle:\u00a0 Observe\/Orient\/Decide\/Act<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Throughout his military career, Boyd was puzzled by something from his youth:\u00a0 the USAF\u2019s immense success in air-to-air combat in Korea.\u00a0 This result (the USAF achieved slightly better than a 10:1 exchange rate in the skies over Korea) was indeed a paradox.\u00a0 Based on objective data, it shouldn\u2019t have happened.<\/p>\n<p>Boyd\u2019s own E-M Theory showed the MIG-15 to be superior in air-to-air combat at most altitudes and speeds.\u00a0 Further, Soviet pilots (who were reputedly flying many of the hostile aircraft in Korea) generally had more training than the normal USAF pilot of the day.\u00a0 Yet the F-86, flown by US pilots with less training, was far superior in practice.<\/p>\n<p>Boyd felt that maneuverability and agility were important, but they obviously weren\u2019t the full answer.\u00a0 So he decided to try and figure out what caused this anomaly.<\/p>\n<p>The result was, like most watershed theories, both blindingly simple and game-changing.\u00a0 The result was the Boyd Cycle model of decision-making \u2013 AKA the \u201c<a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/OODA_loop\">OODA Loop<\/a>\u201d.\u00a0 If you\u2019ve ever heard the term \u201cdecision cycle\u201d or \u201cdecision loop\u201d, you\u2019ve heard a reference to Boyd\u2019s work.<\/p>\n<p>If there has been a more generally applicable model of decision making developed in the last 50 years I couldn\u2019t tell you what that is.\u00a0 Boyd&#8217;s OODA Loop is IMO perhaps the most fundamental contribution to the study of conflict since the development of combined arms operations.\u00a0 It also seems to be universally applicable; in explaining decision-making, only von Neumann&#8217;s work on Game Theory seems more fundamental and applicable.<\/p>\n<p>Boyd continued to work for DoD as an nearly-unpaid consultant (his former colleague Christie was now highly placed in the Pentagon, and offered him a position on his staff).\u00a0 Boyd accepted &#8211; and insisted on working for no pay.\u00a0 He was forced to accept 1\/10 normal salary \u2013 1 day\u2019s pay every 2 weeks \u2013 due to Federal personnel rules.\u00a0 (Presumably Boyd insisted on working for no pay in order to maintain his \u201cindependence\u201d, as he was anything but stupid.)<\/p>\n<p>He developed his ideas regarding OODA and conflict, incorporating the results into a briefing he called <i><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><a href=\"http:\/\/www.ausairpower.net\/JRB\/poc.pdf\">Patterns of Conflict<\/a><\/span>.<\/i> He began giving the briefing to anyone who would listen in 1976, revising it nearly continually.\u00a0 (The linked version earlier in this paragraph is from 1986.)<\/p>\n<p>Boyd found willing listeners.\u00a0 But those listeners weren\u2019t in his parent service.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">Warfighting<\/span><\/p>\n<p>In the early 1980s, Boyd was a consultant to the USMC.\u00a0 He gave his <i>Patterns of Conflict<\/i> briefing to the USMC Amphibious Warfare School.<\/p>\n<p>The school\u2019s leadership felt the ideas had merit.\u00a0 And they were looking to revise USMC warfighting doctrine at the time.<\/p>\n<p>The result was a major change in USMC doctrine.\u00a0 The USMC called it <i>maneuver warfare<\/i>.\u00a0 This doctrine incorporated the ideas presented by Boyd in <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">Patterns of Conflict<\/span>.<\/p>\n<p>The result was formalized in <a href=\"http:\/\/www.marines.mil\/Portals\/59\/Publications\/MCDP%201%20Warfighting.pdf\">MCDP 1, Warfighting<\/a>.\u00a0 As far as I know it remains in effect as USMC doctrine today.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">Desert Storm and OIF<br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p>By 1990, Boyd\u2019s health was failing.\u00a0 He had moved to Florida to live out the remainder of his life.<\/p>\n<p>Fate intervened.\u00a0 He was to have one last mission.<\/p>\n<p>Boyd had given his Patterns of Conflict brief to an obscure Congressman in 1981 \u2013 a Congressman named Cheney.<\/p>\n<p>In 1990, Cheney was no longer in Congress.\u00a0 He was the US SECDEF.<\/p>\n<p>After Iraq invaded Kuwait and the US began preparations for the Gulf War, SECDEF Cheney asked Boyd to work on strategy for DS\/DS.\u00a0 Boyd and his ideas were instrumental in the final theater strategy for Desert Storm \u2013 specifically, the famed \u201cleft hook\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>The results speak for themselves.\u00a0 In the words of former <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dnipogo.org\/fcs\/boyd_thesis.htm#career\">CMC Gen Krulak<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\u201cBludgeoned from the air nearly around the clock for six weeks, paralyzed by the speed and ferocity of the attack, the Iraqi army collapsed morally and intellectually under the onslaught of American and Coalition forces. \u00a0John Boyd was an architect of that victory as surely as if he\u2019d commanded a fighter wing or a maneuver division in the desert.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>We\u2019d almost certainly have won using a different strategy.\u00a0 But we\u2019d have sent a lot more body bags home.<\/p>\n<p>Boyd\u2019s strategic theories are also generally regarded as having been behind the successful campaign to topple the Hussein Regime in Iraq in 2003.\u00a0 The conduct of the Operation Iraqi Freedom invasion has been called by some the most complete, full-scale implementation of Boyd\u2019s theories to date.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">Decidedly Not Perfect<\/span><\/p>\n<p>As a human being, Boyd was far from perfect.\u00a0 He was famously profane; arrogant as hell; abrasive as sandpaper; and as volatile as nitroglycerine.\u00a0 He could be insubordinate, was not a spit-and-polish individual, and apparently had little respect for bureaucracy.\u00a0 He was an \u201cin your face\u201d kind of guy \u2013 literally, from a few inches away, spittle flying during an argument.\u00a0 This is reflected in a couple of nicknames Boyd acquired during his career:\u00a0 \u201cGhengis John\u201d and \u201cThe Mad Major\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>And he reputedly smoked truly foul thin cigars.\u00a0 (smile)<\/p>\n<p>In short, he was in many ways the embodiment of the stereotypical fighter pilot:\u00a0 brash, arrogant, profane, and overly aggressive.\u00a0 Except Boyd had one other characteristic as well:\u00a0 he was often smarter than anyone else in the room.\u00a0 He may have been arrogant, but he usually had justification.<\/p>\n<p>Yet even regarding his personality &#8211; which was no great secret to anyone &#8211; Boyd was difficult to &#8220;pigeonhole&#8221;.\u00a0 In spite of his legendary profanity, he once reportedly left a fellow pilot\u2019s bachelor party because he was embarrassed by the \u201cexotic\u201d nature of the entertainment.<\/p>\n<p>Boyd appeared to affect others in a binary manner \u2013 they either detested or loved him; few were ambivalent.\u00a0 Over his career, he made many enemies.\u00a0 That likely was a factor leading to his retirement from the USAF after far less than 30 years.\u00a0 And his refusal to \u201cgo along to get along\u201d doubtless cost him any chance at stars.<\/p>\n<p>Boyd was also reputedly neglectful of his family.\u00a0 He lived well below his status, and forced his family to do the same, leading to another nickname:\u00a0 the \u201cGhetto Colonel\u201d.\u00a0 His family suffered as a result.\u00a0 It was reputedly feared that at least one of his children would refuse to attend his funeral.\u00a0 This is likely due to his wanting to maintain his independence.\u00a0 Boyd is reputed to have said:\u00a0 <em>\u201cThe most important thing in life is to be free to do things. There are only two ways to insure that freedom \u2014 you can be rich or you can you reduce your needs to zero.\u201d<\/em>\u00a0 Boyd apparently opted for the latter.<\/p>\n<p>A complex man?\u00a0 You betcha.<\/p>\n<p>In the final analysis, Boyd appears to have seen himself as a man of integrity.\u00a0 Another of his quotes sums that up succinctly:\u00a0 <em>\u201cAsk for my loyalty, I\u2019ll\u00a0 give you my honesty. Ask for my honesty, you\u2019ll have my loyalty.\u201d<\/em>\u00a0 He indeed stayed loyal to himself.<\/p>\n<p>I wish I\u2019d had the chance to meet the man.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">Legacy<\/span><\/p>\n<p>John Richard Boyd died of cancer on March 9, 1997.\u00a0 He lived just a few weeks longer than the Biblical threescore and ten.<\/p>\n<p>Boyd published very little for posterity.\u00a0 Other than his early 1960s <em>Aerial Attack Study,\u00a0<\/em>his mid-1960s <em>Energy Maneuverability Theory<\/em> (both classified military publications at the time) and one brief unclassified 1976 essay \u2013 <i><a href=\"http:\/\/www.goalsys.com\/books\/documents\/DESTRUCTION_AND_CREATION.pdf\">Destruction and Creation<\/a><\/i> \u2013 he never considered his major life works (his <em>Patterns of Conflict<\/em> briefing and the longer, more complete <i><a href=\"http:\/\/dnipogo.org\/john-r-boyd\/\">Discourse on Winning &amp; Losing<\/a><\/i> briefing) finished.\u00a0 He thus never published them.\u00a0 He wrote no books.<\/p>\n<p>Yet consider his career accomplishments and impact:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Literally \u201cwrote the first book\u201d on USAF jet air-to-air combat.<\/li>\n<li>With Thomas Christie, developed Energy Maneuverability Theory.<\/li>\n<li>Was instrumental to the successful development of four front-line combat aircraft.<\/li>\n<li>Provided the theoretical basis for a US military service\u2019s warfighting doctrine.<\/li>\n<li>Provided the basis for a winning war strategy (some would say, for two winning war strategies).<\/li>\n<li>And, finally:\u00a0 developed a new, major theory of individual and organizational decision making &#8211; one that seems to be universally applicable.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Any <em>one<\/em> of those would be a worthwhile legacy.\u00a0 To have done <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><em>all<\/em><\/span> of them in the course of one lifetime is . . . amazing.\u00a0 Simply amazing.<\/p>\n<p>I suspect we\u2019ll be talking about Boyd\u2019s ideas \u2013 and using them \u2013 for a long, long time.<\/p>\n<p>Rest in peace, Colonel.\u00a0 You\u2019ve left us plenty to consider.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">For More Info<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Posthumously, John R. Boyd is finally getting some of the recognition he is IMO due.\u00a0 There are a number of Internet sites that have collections of his ideas, copies of his works, adaptations of his theories, and articles about him.\u00a0 His bio at Arlington National Cemetery gives a reasonable overview of his career and work.\u00a0 Many others give further details.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.arlingtoncemetery.net\/jrboyd.htm\">http:\/\/www.arlingtoncemetery.net\/jrboyd.htm<\/a><\/p>\n<p>An excellent, relatively short article summarizing Boyd and his impact can be found at <a href=\"http:\/\/www.usafa.edu\/df\/dfh\/docs\/Harmon54.pdf\">http:\/\/www.usafa.edu\/df\/dfh\/docs\/Harmon54.pdf<\/a> ; a somewhat hagiographic but excellent article by one of his acolytes, <a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Franklin_C._Spinney\">Franklin C. \u201cChuck\u201d Spinney<\/a>, can be found at <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dnipogo.org\/fcs\/comments\/c199.htm\">http:\/\/www.dnipogo.org\/fcs\/comments\/c199.htm<\/a> .<\/p>\n<p>Another decent article comes from Forbes:\u00a0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.forbes.com\/2003\/04\/23\/cz_df_0423ooda.html\">http:\/\/www.forbes.com\/2003\/04\/23\/cz_df_0423ooda.html<\/a><\/p>\n<p>There are also now, thankfully, many others.\u00a0 If interested, do a Google search and spend a few hours reading.<\/p>\n<p>Boyd\u2019s critical role in changing the F-15\u2019s initial design is documented in <a href=\"http:\/\/www.afhso.af.mil\/shared\/media\/document\/AFD-120516-036.pdf\">http:\/\/www.afhso.af.mil\/shared\/media\/document\/AFD-120516-036.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Air Power Australia seems to have the best collection of Boyd\u2019s surviving materials:<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.ausairpower.net\/APA-Boyd-Papers.html\">http:\/\/www.ausairpower.net\/APA-Boyd-Papers.html<\/a><\/p>\n<p>I\u2019ve not been able to find a copy of Boyd and Christie\u2019s Energy-Maneuverability Theory report that\u2019s readily available.\u00a0 It is cited by NASA in <a href=\"http:\/\/ntrs.nasa.gov\/archive\/nasa\/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov\/19740020394_1974020394.pdf\">this document<\/a> as follows:\u00a0 <em>Boyd, John R.; and Christie, Thomas P.: Energy-Maneuverability Theory, Rept. APGC-TDR-62-64-35 (Secret). A. F. Systems Command Air Proving Ground Ctr., Eglin AFB, Fla., May 1964\u00a0 <\/em>I\u2019m reasonably sure this study has been declassified since it was written, but perhaps I\u2019m wrong.\u00a0 If anyone can find a softcopy of this document, please advise and I\u2019ll link it here.<\/p>\n<p>The Boyd quotes in this article are from this source:\u00a0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.goodreads.com\/author\/quotes\/98862.John_Boyd\">http:\/\/www.goodreads.com\/author\/quotes\/98862.John_Boyd<\/a><\/p>\n<p>A number of books have been written about Boyd and\/or which are directly devoted to his theories.\u00a0 Many adapt his theories to new fields and\/or current conflicts.\u00a0 Three such that are well-reputed (disclaimer \u2013 I\u2019ve not read them, but they are on my Christmas list and I hope to do so soon) are:<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">Boyd:\u00a0 The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War<\/span>, by Robert Coram (ISBN-10:\u00a0 0316796883)<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security<\/span>, by Grant T. Hammond (ISBN-10: 158834178X)<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd<\/span>, by Frans P. P. Osinga (ISBN-10:\u00a0 0415459524)<\/p>\n<p>Coram\u2019s work reportedly is mostly biographical, Hammond\u2019s biography has a historical\/security perspective, and Osinga\u2019s reportedly delves most deeply into exploring Boyd\u2019s theories.<\/p>\n<p><em>Note:\u00a0 the original version of this article indicated that Boyd had received orders for Vietnam prior to his work on the F-15.\u00a0 Further reading has indicated that Boyd&#8217;s orders were instead for Okinawa.\u00a0 However, Boyd did receive the VSM.\u00a0 Further reading also indicated that Boyd served at Nakhon-Phanom RTAFB in the early 1970s in support of the Vietnam War &#8211; specifically, supporting Operation IGLOO WHITE.\u00a0 He was not assigned duties as a pilot during this tour, and never flew combat missions over Vietnam.\u00a0 He did fly some missions as aircrew over Laos until his superiors discovered that he was doing so.\u00a0 He was then ordered to quit doing so due to his intimate knowledge of Operation IGLOO WHITE.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>\u201cTiger, one day you will come to a fork in the road and you\u2019re going to &hellip; <a title=\"To Be . . . Or To Do?\" class=\"hm-read-more\" href=\"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/?p=38799\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">To Be . . . Or To Do?<\/span>Read more<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":623,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[187,10,84],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-38799","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-air-force","category-historical","category-military-issues"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/38799","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/623"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=38799"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/38799\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=38799"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=38799"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=38799"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}