In WWII, several new theories of war were developed, most of which are still in practice today.\u00a0 From the Blitzkrieg, essentially an armored thrust designed to penetrate deep into the heart of the enemy lines and create chaos in the rear area, to the idea of Strategic Bombing, the idea of bombing civil infrastructure to reduce overall military power, we still employ most of the ideas honed in the conflagration that engulfed the world.\u00a0 The major problem is that we are no longer fighting WWII.\u00a0 We have seen the severe weakness of the standard playbook in recent years, and unfortunately have failed to recognize and adapt to the changing realities the battlefield presents.<\/p>\n
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Take the Blitz for instance.\u00a0 One could aptly call it a spear thrust, because that’s almost exactly what it is.\u00a0 The support, and the actual fighting formations all move on the same roads at the same pace in the same direction.\u00a0 When facing down a numerically superior force in a defensive posture, the Blitz works quite well.\u00a0 However as we saw in Iraq, sweeping aside a numerically superior force was almost laughably easy but securing the areas we had gained was next to impossible with the forces we had available.\u00a0 Many of the weapons and soldiers that would ignite the insurgency were able to slip into the populace because the US formations were not able to sweep and clear the towns like Nassaryiah or Najaaf that they just swept through.\u00a0 When the insurgency was finally upon the troops they had to go back and sweep and clear a lot of the same towns that they’d fought through in the initial push.\u00a0 Whole stockpiles of military munitions were left unguarded, and the failure to provide order and prevent looting showed how totally inequitably the generals had prepared for the Iraq War.\u00a0 One wonders how many lives on both sides might have been saved if the ground commanders had had both adequate forces, and the wherewithal to say that getting to Baghdad in 30 days was less important than securing Iraq for the long haul.<\/p>\n
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Then there’s Strategic Bombing.\u00a0 Perhaps we should have learned in the Korean War, when B-29 formations ran out of significant targets within the first week, that Strategic Bombing doesn’t work if the enemy has no infrastructure.\u00a0 Advocates of Strategic Bombing often point to WWII, in both Germany and Europe, and also to Bosnia and Kosovo as proof positive that it can<\/em> work.\u00a0 But there were other factors that make it clear that it was more a supporting factor than an actual causal one.\u00a0 For instance during one night when Tokyo was hit with a massive incendiary strike over 100,000 people died, which is more than the combined total of deaths from both<\/em> atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.\u00a0 But Tokyo wasn’t the only target hit.\u00a0 Yokohama, Nagoya, Kobe. . . really every major Japanese city was almost leveled, as was nearly every German city.\u00a0 Even the London Blitz in 1940 should make it clear that such bombing it not entirely effective.\u00a0 It is true that such attacks did affect industry, and thus have a supporting <\/em> role in ending the war, but the Germans had to be almost completely smashed from both sides, and the Japanese had to have super-weapons dropped on them before they gave up.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Even the example of Kosovo is fundamentally flawed.\u00a0 True the bombing campaign did<\/em> have an effect, but not as great as we often try to make it sound like it did.\u00a0 Did Milosevic step aside because American bombers were blowing up his infrastructure with impunity, or was it because the US was starting to mobilize ground forces?\u00a0 We may never know exactly, but it raises enough of a question that we should not be so readily relying on air strikes as the one stop shop for winning wars.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Perhaps most of all the drone program should prove the inherent fallacy of Strategic Bombing.\u00a0 Since there is no infrastructure of note for the Taliban and al Qaeda who seem perfectly happy to “rough it” in what is essentially early steel age conditions what targets are there left for the roving war planes?\u00a0 People.\u00a0 There’s just one slight problem here.\u00a0 In simplest language we don’t know who we’re killing.\u00a0 We don’t know what we’re hitting, and once the missile is launched there’s really no recalling it.\u00a0 True there are a ton of terrorists that have been killed, but who else<\/em> have we killed?\u00a0 Doctors?\u00a0 Engineers?\u00a0 Perhaps even the very people that we might be able to use as assets against the propaganda of the terrorists.\u00a0 Relying on Strategic Bombing in Pakistan, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Libya have lead to the situation spinning out of control, and the view from the top becoming even more confusing than ever.\u00a0 We simply don’t know whose doing what with whom and for what purpose anymore.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Now with armed intervention in Syria looking ever more likely it seems almost a foregone conclusion that it will take the exact same route as the intervention in Libya.\u00a0 We have no idea who the rebels are, and no way of gaining even a semblance of control, but we will most likely use a series of low risk air strikes to “help” the rebels.\u00a0 This will work *eventually* to weaken the Assad forces and potentially even weaken Iranian influence in the region, or it might backfire and create a chaotic churning mass of old rivalries and hatreds that continue to churn for the next decade or more.\u00a0 The fault lines in the Middle East are not solely along the borders of Israel, but everywhere where there is more than one race, and Syria is perhaps one of the most diverse ME nation.\u00a0 Arabs will kill Assyrians, Kurds will kill Arabs.\u00a0 This is to say nothing of the Persians or the half dozen other ethnic groups in the country that will only make it worse.\u00a0 That is to say nothing<\/em> of the rift between Sunni and Shi’a.\u00a0 Worse still, as we have seen in Afghanistan, and Iraq, internal conflicts have a way of spilling over into neighboring nations.\u00a0 The violence in Syria seems to be corresponding with an uptick in the violence in Iraq.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Libya was at least a stable state before the Qaddafi was targeted.\u00a0 Now the Libyans don’t even really have a semblance of order, it is controlled by roving militias which might as well be the same as firing the police forces of Chicago and turning it over to the Gangs.\u00a0 This is to say nothing of the serious military hardware that was just left behind by the Qaddafi regime.\u00a0 Surface to Air Missiles, (SAMs), anti-aircraft artillery pieces, artillery shells, long range rockets, mortars. . . in the hands of an army such things would be trivial and out dated even, but in the hands of terrorists who neither recognize nor fight for any state, unparallelled chaos could be wrought across the globe.\u00a0 This is what is in store for us if we intervene in Syria as we did in Libya.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n We can no longer afford to kid ourselves that we can win a few wars inexpensively but dropping a few “surgical” bombs in key places.\u00a0 Air Power will always play a role in warfare for as long as we are able to fly, but we can not pretend anymore that it is the be all end all. \u00a0 If we are to intervene in Syria it will take an Army and Marine Corps that we simply don’t have anymore.\u00a0 If we intervene we will need ground forces to secure the weapons left behind, and provide order during the transition.\u00a0 With the looming draw downs due so sequestration, and the cost of over a decade at war, sending any appreciable ground force into Syria would strain the ground combat services nearly to the breaking point.\u00a0 Worse still the Navy and Air Force would be unable to support those troops as they too are looking at drastic cuts to their manpower and capabilities.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n In all honesty I can not see what anyone hopes to gain by involvement in Syria.\u00a0 The same people who cited how Iraq was an “Illegal War” seem to be pushing us towards Syria for might the same reasons we got involved in Iraq.\u00a0 With Us influence on the wane in the last five years, it would be doubtful how many allies we could entice to such a venture.\u00a0 We could always “go it alone” but as I said before we simply don’t have the forces, or perhaps even more important the political and popular will to do so.\u00a0 Unfortunately our President has backed himself into a corner by talking about “red lines,” and issuing dire threats to the Assad regime.\u00a0 Now that it appears that chemical weapons have in fact been used the US must<\/em> intervene or lose even more face and political clout internationally.\u00a0 The Drone President can not simply whip out a few strikes from UAVs hold up some dead terrorists and claim victory this time.\u00a0 As the Bard said; “Let us talk of Graves, of worms, and Epitaphs. . . Let us sit upon the ground and tell sad stories of the death of kings; How some have been depose; some slain in war, some haunted by the ghosts of those they deposed.”<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"