The Air Force is often ribbed about being the least military of the services, and about being the least \u201chardcore\u201d.\u00a0 Frankly, there\u2019s an element of truth to that.\u00a0 Life in the USAF appears to be closer to civilian life than any of the other services.\u00a0 USAF facilities and working conditions are generally better than in the other services.\u00a0 It\u2019s a running joke that when building a base the USAF first builds the clubs, MWR facilities, and housing, starts building the runways \u2013 then runs out of money and asks Congress for a supplemental appropriation to finish the runways and buy the planes.\u00a0 (smile)<\/p>\n
Still, elements of the USAF serve at risk like the other services.\u00a0 At times, they serve valiantly \u2013 and tragically.<\/p>\n
What follows is a short version of one such incident.\u00a0 The story was suppressed for years, and though now public it is still is not well known.\u00a0 It is the story of the fall of Lima Site 85 \u2013 a facility that did not at the time officially exist.<\/p>\n
Background<\/span><\/p>\n US military involvement in Laos officially ended in 1962, when the US agreed to respect Laotian neutrality.\u00a0 The Laotian Civil War, however, continued.\u00a0 The US and North Vietnam thus continued to support opposing sides in that conflict \u2013 the US, the Royal Laotian government under Prince Souvana Phouma, the North Vietnamee the Pathet Lao.<\/p>\n After the 1962 neutrality agreement, US support to and activity in Laos for a time was largely clandestine.\u00a0 The same is true of later US operations in Laos which supported the widening war in Vietnam.\u00a0 This remained the case in 1964 and 1965, as US bombing campaigns (e.g., Operation Barrel Roll) in Laos were not publicly acknowledged.<\/p>\n However, the start of sustained air operations against North Vietnam – Operation Rolling Thunder – pointed out the operational need for navigational aids for those US bombing operations.\u00a0 These could be most effectively provided from northeastern Laos \u2013 which was within a reasonable distance of both Hanoi and Haiphong, primary targets of Rolling Thunder operations.\u00a0 The site chosen was Phou Pha Thi \u2013 a mountain in northeastern Laos approximately 15 miles from the North Vietnamese border.\u00a0 An unmanned TACAN was installed at that location in August 1966.<\/p>\n While useful, TACAN was not sufficient support for US bombing operations in North Vietnam.\u00a0 During the Southeast Asian rainy season – roughly Nov through April – visual bombing was often not feasible.\u00a0 Because of the decision to officially observe Laotian neutrality, the US was unable to deploy military forces to Laos or establish military facilities there.\u00a0 The decision was therefore made to establish a clandestine AN\/TSQ-81 radar site at Phou Pha Thi.<\/p>\n The site would be staffed by USAF personnel who would be temporarily discharged from active duty and employed as civilian \u201ctechnicians\u201d, and who would then be reinstated in the USAF on completion of their duties in Laos.\u00a0 (The process was referred to as “sheep dipping”, and was essentially the same process applied to U-2 pilots working for the CIA while the U-2 was overflying the Soviet Union.)\u00a0 The program was called “Heavy Green”.\u00a0 The site at Phou Pha Thi was referred to as Lima Site 85 – the designation of a nearby clandestine CIA airfield supporting Laotian forces under Gen Vang Pao.<\/p>\n The AN\/TSQ-81 radar at Lima Site 85 was installed over several months in 1967.\u00a0 It became operational in November of that year.\u00a0 Once operational, this allowed precision bombing of targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas during all weather conditions.<\/p>\n Defense of Lima Site 85 was provided by indigenous Laotian forces and their Thai allies.\u00a0 Indeed, initially only US CIA personnel on-site were armed \u2013 the \u201ccivilian\u201d personnel assigned to the site were forbidden to carry arms for virtually the entire time that the site was in operation.<\/p>\n The site was a mountaintop site, with sheer cliffs on 3 sides.\u00a0 These were thought to be impassible and were left unguarded by local forces.\u00a0 The fourth side was well defended by Laotian and Thai forces.\u00a0 Thai troops also provided local security at the operational mountaintop radar\/TACAN site.<\/p>\n However, past experience should have argued otherwise.\u00a0 Phou Pha Thi had previously been captured by Pathet Lao forces in 1959 \u2013 by an assault involving scaling one of these supposedly impregnable cliff faces.\u00a0 Ignoring this past history was to prove a serious mistake.<\/p>\n Early Enemy Reaction<\/span><\/p>\n The North Vietnamese were well aware of the new capability provided by the AN\/TSQ-81 at Phou Pha Thi, and began actions to target it in early 1968.\u00a0 They began moving NVA and Pathet Lao forces to the area.\u00a0 In one of the few documented North Vietnamese air raids of the Vietnam War, they attacked the site by air using two AN-2 biplanes on 12 January 1968.\u00a0 (The air attack caused minor damage, but the site was quickly returned to operational status.)\u00a0 Both attacking aircraft were shot down by a CIA paramilitary officer – Glenn Woods \u2013 using an AK-47.\u00a0 Woods was a passenger in an Air America Bell 212 helicopter piloted by Air America pilot Theodore Moore that responded during the North Vietnamese air attack.<\/p>\n However, intelligence reports and other indications showed continuing massing of NVA and Pathet Lao forces around Lima Site 85.\u00a0 Probing attacks showed continued enemy interest.\u00a0 By mid-February, the mountain was surrounded by enemy forces approximately 12 km away.\u00a0 Documents had also been captured which gave plans for an enemy attack on the facility.<\/p>\n Due to the importance of Lima Site 85 to USAF operations in North Vietnam and its political sensitivity, it was controlled by the US Ambassador to Laos, William H. Sullivan.\u00a0 As primary user, the 7th Air Force had extensive input into the site’s operations.\u00a0 This was to prove problematic; Sullivan reputedly vigorously exercised his authority over US activities in Laos, and his relationship with the US military was often antagonistic.<\/p>\n This combination led to several issues regarding operations at Lima Site 85.\u00a0 Because of political considerations, Lao and Thai forces provided site security; US personnel operating the Lima Site 85 facilities were at first completely unarmed and were authorized an insufficient quantity of small arms weapons only a few days prior to the loss of the site.\u00a0 Only Ambassador Sullivan could order the site abandoned \u2013 the local site commander did not have this authority \u2013 but 7th Air Force’s position was that the site was critical and must be maintained in operation as long as possible.\u00a0 Finally, operational site defense and evacuation procedures were not terribly well-thought-out or practiced, and were lacking in contingency planning in the event of unexpected enemy action.<\/p>\n Sullivan had been advised by the CIA that Lima Site 85’s security past approximately 10 March 1968 was problematic due to enemy activity.\u00a0 However, due to its extreme importance to US air operations in North Vietnam, the 7th Air Force indicated in a 5 March 1968 correspondence that the site “”would not be evacuated until capture appeared imminent\u201d.<\/p>\n Site Capture<\/span><\/p>\n After a substantial period of relative calm after the January 1968 air raid, the NVA and Pathet Lao began their final attack on Lima Site 85.\u00a0 A rocket\/mortar\/artillery barrage on the evening of 10 March 1968 signaled the beginning of the final enemy assault.<\/p>\n During the night, the site\u2019s operational personnel directed air attacks against local targets.\u00a0 However, late that evening Ambassador Sullivan ordered the partial evacuation of the site at first light the following morning.\u00a0 At 0515 the next morning, Ambassador Sullivan changed this order to a full evacuation.<\/p>\n Unfortunately, during the night a team of 33 North Vietnamese sappers had scaled the western cliffs of Phou Pha Thi.\u00a0 At approximately 0300, they began their attack.<\/p>\n Surprise was complete.\u00a0 It is believed that 11 of the 19 US personnel on site were killed outright during the initial assault or died from their wounds not long afterwards.\u00a0 North Vietnamese accounts later received by the US, as well as later interviews conducted with North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao personnel participating in the attack, indicate no prisoners were taken.<\/p>\n The eight US personnel remaining alive at that point were split into multiple groups.\u00a0 Five US personnel had spent the night on a ledge below the operational site (they had been off-duty during the night and had chosen to sleep on the ledge that night vice in their normal lodging area \u2013 a decision that likely saved their lives during the initial attack); three were still alive at this point, though two were wounded.\u00a0 Others were on the mountaintop, wounded but still alive.\u00a0 The CIA personnel were at other locations in the vicinity.<\/p>\n The survivors on the ledge were joined by another wounded survivor from the mountaintop and were extracted by an Air America Bell 212 at approximately 0730 on 11 March 1968.\u00a0 Immediately after extraction, one of the survivors was mortally wounded by hostile fire from the ground and died while en route to Thailand.<\/p>\n Air America aircraft and USAF HH-3 helicopters evacuated the remaining survivors, plus a number of wounded Laotian and Thai troops, from various locations on the mountain.\u00a0 Evacuation was completed by approximately 0946 on 11 March 1968.<\/p>\n Site Destruction<\/span><\/p>\n As a clandestine facility, Lima Site 85’s operational assets had been rigged for destruction.\u00a0 There is some evidence that site personnel may have disabled or removed at least some of the explosives originally rigged for demolition due to concerns regarding the possibility of sympathetic detonation from enemy mortar\/artillery\/rocket fire targeting the mountaintop.\u00a0 In any case, the site\u2019s destruction plan (described by various sources as involving the use of both explosive and incendiary devices) was not executed due the enemy achieving complete tactical surprise during their attack.<\/p>\n Due to the clandestine nature of Lima Site 85, a concerted effort was made to destroy any remaining equipment and facilities after the site had been captured.\u00a0 This was accomplished by the USAF on 13 March 1968 via aerial bombardment with high explosive and incendiary weapons.\u00a0 However, during these attacks a USAF aircraft and its pilot were lost.<\/p>\n US Losses<\/span><\/p>\n A total of 19 US personnel were present at Lima Site 85 at the time of its loss.\u00a0 \u00a0Of these 19 US personnel, 8 were accounted for immediately afterwards; 11 were missing in action (MIA) and presumed killed or captured.\u00a0 The 11 US personnel MIA were later all declared killed-in-action\/body not recovered (KIA\/BNR).\u00a0 An additional USAF pilot was lost during post-battle air operations at Lima Site 85 when his aircraft was shot down.<\/p>\n Seven US personnel returned alive from Lima Site 85:\u00a0 Capt. Stanley J. Sliz, SSgt. John Daniel, SSgt. Bill Husband, SSgt. Jack Starling, Sgt. Roger Huffman, Howard Freeman, and John Spence. \u00a0\u00a0Freeman and Spence were CIA paramilitary personnel.\u00a0 (One source differs and refers to one of these individuals as a \u201cHuey Marlow\u201d; it is unclear as to which of these CIA individuals the name \u201cHuey Marlow\u201d refers).\u00a0 Huffman was a USAF Combat Controller present at the site to coordinate local air support.<\/p>\n CMsgt. Richard Etchberger was mortally wounded during the evacuation.\u00a0 He died of his wounds while enroute to Udorn AB, Thailand.<\/p>\n Eleven US personnel were not accounted for after the loss of Lima Site 85 on 11 March 1968.\u00a0 These individuals, all USAF, were Lt. Col. Clarence F. Blanton, MSgt. James H. Calfee, TSgt. Melvin A. Holland, SSgt. Herbert A. Kirk, SSgt. Henry G. Gish, SSgt. Willis R. Hall, SSgt. James W. Davis, SSgt. David S. Price, TSgt. Donald K. Springsteadah, SSgt. Don F. Worley, and TSgt. Patrick L. Shannon.\u00a0 Additionally, Capt. Donald L. Westbrook was lost during post-battle air operations to destroy the remnants of Lima Site 85 on 13 March 1968 when his aircraft was downed by enemy fire.\u00a0 His remains were also initially not recovered.<\/p>\n Remains belonging to TSgt. Shannon, Capt. Westbrook, and Lt. Col Blanton were later recovered and were positively identified in 2005, 2007, and 2012, respectively.\u00a0\u00a0 Remains belonging to the other nine US KIA at Lima Site 85 have not yet been recovered and positively identified.<\/p>\n Aftermath<\/span><\/p>\n Twenty days after the loss of Lima Site 85, the POTUS declared a halt to all US bombing operations in North Vietnam north of the 20th parallel.\u00a0 This declaration removed the operational need for Lima Site 85\u2019s TACAN and radar facilities.\u00a0 No attempt was later made to restore them.<\/p>\n The 11 US personnel lost on Lima Site 85 \u2013 technically civilian technicians at the time of loss \u2013 were reinstated in the USAF.\u00a0 In 1984, they were posthumously awarded the Bronze Star Medal.<\/p>\n US operations in Laos were first acknowledged in 1970.\u00a0 However, the official after-action report regarding the fall of Lima Site 85 was not declassified until 1988, and reportedly contains errors.\u00a0 North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao accounts of the battle were not obtained until several years later.<\/p>\n CMSgt. Etchburger was awarded a posthumous Air Force Cross for his valor in combat on 11 March 1968.\u00a0 CMSgt. Etchburger\u2019s widow was presented his posthumously-awarded Air Force Cross in a private ceremony in January, 1969.\u00a0 His actions on 11 March 1968 saved the lives of at least three wounded comrades.<\/p>\n CMSgt. Etchburger was initially recommended to receive the Medal of Honor.\u00a0 However, although the USAF Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen. John D. Ryan, reportedly agreed that Etchburger\u2019s valor merited the Medal of Honor, he opted to downgrade the award to the Air Force Cross for political and security reasons.<\/p>\n That injustice was corrected in 2010, and CMSgt. Etchburger\u2019s surviving sons were presented his posthumous Medal of Honor by the POTUS.\u00a0 Unfortunately, his widow did not live to see that injustice corrected; she passed away in 1994.<\/p>\n The fall of Lima Site 85 was the largest single ground-combat loss of USAF personnel during the Vietnam War.\u00a0 Though many factors contributed to the loss of life, the root cause was an error in judgment regarding when the site should be evacuated and destroyed \u2013 an error that cost 11 US personnel their lives.<\/p>\n US Ambassador to Laos William H. Sullivan perhaps summed up the entire situation best in a single sentence in his 11 March 1968 initial cable regarding the site\u2019s loss:\u00a0 \u201cAt first glance, however, it appears we may have pushed our luck one day too long in attempting to keep this facility in operation.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n Rest in peace, my elder brothers-in-arms.\u00a0 May the remaining 9 of you be recovered and identified soon.<\/p>\n . . .<\/p>\n Author\u2019s note:\u00a0 This brief article was developed from the following on-line sources, with the latter two being primary.\u00a0 In particular, the last two sources give excellent account of CMSgt Etchburger\u2019s heroism on 10-11 March 1968.\u00a0 The first source provides the quote from Ambassador Sullivan which led to the title of the article.\u00a0 These sources are not always consistent, and I have done my best to synthesize multiple sources into a coherent article here.\u00a0 All sources provide additional detail, including maps, photographs, and other graphics associated with Lima Site 85.\u00a0 Errors in this article are mine.<\/i><\/p>\n http:\/\/www.limasite85.us\/the_destruction_of_lima_site_85.htm<\/a><\/i><\/p>\n http:\/\/combat-skyspot.tripod.com\/commandoclub.htm<\/a><\/i><\/p>\n https:\/\/www.cia.gov\/library\/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence\/csi-publications\/csi-studies\/studies\/95unclass\/Linder.html<\/a><\/i><\/p>\n http:\/\/www.virtualwall.org\/dw\/WestbrookDE01a.htm<\/a><\/i><\/p>\n http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Battle_of_Lima_Site_85<\/a><\/i><\/p>\n http:\/\/www.airforcemag.com\/MagazineArchive\/Pages\/2010\/November%202010\/1110MOH.aspx<\/a><\/i><\/p>\n