We call the period between the end of World War II and the end of the Soviet Union the \u201cCold War\u201d.\u00a0 And in truth, it wasn\u2019t an all-out, no-holds-barred global fight like World War II.<\/p>\n
But it wasn\u2019t always particularly \u201ccold\u201d, either.<\/p>\n
The US and USSR (through allies) engaged in numerous wars by proxy throughout that period.\u00a0 Korea, French Indochina, the Hukbalapap Rebellion in the Philippines, Quemoy\/Matsu, the Arab-Israeli Wars, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Congo, Angola, Afghanistan, Grenada \u2013 the number of proxy conflicts, as well as casualties, were extensive.<\/p>\n
Even disregarding proxy wars, direct hostile fire incidents involving US and\/or either Soviet or Soviet-client forces were not unknown.\u00a0 Some such incidents are reasonably well-known:\u00a0 the 1968 seizure of the USS Pueblo<\/em><\/a>; the murder of MAJ Arthur Nicholson<\/a> in East Germany in 1985; the 1976 Panmunjom Ax Murder Incident<\/a>; the 1983 downing of KAL-007<\/a>.\u00a0 But our collective memory for many if not most such incidents has faded to the point that most are remembered only dimly, if at all.<\/p>\n Such Cold War hostile fire incidents were far more common than most people realize.\u00a0 The Defense POW\/Missing Personnel Office maintains a list of 126 US personnel still unaccounted<\/a> for due to 14 Cold War aircraft losses.\u00a0 Two of these incidents (and 18 of the personnel still unaccounted for) were apparently not due to hostile action \u2013 but the other twelve aircraft and 108 personnel were indeed lost due to hostile fire.\u00a0 And these 14 incidents are nowhere near a complete list of even Cold War aerial hostile fire incidents; it records only those where US personnel are still missing and formally unaccounted for.\u00a0 A more comprehensive list of such Cold War aerial hostile fire incidents may be found here<\/a>.\u00a0 There were also numerous other hostile incidents on ground and at sea.<\/p>\n Perhaps the deadliest single Cold War hostile fire incident involving US forces is today virtually unknown.\u00a0 Like the USS Pueblo<\/em>, it was the result of hostile action by a Soviet client\u00a0\u2013 North Korea\u00a0\u2013 and involved the US Navy.\u00a0 But unlike the USS Pueblo<\/em>, no US survivors returned.<\/p>\n The 44th anniversary of that incident occurs shortly before midnight EDT tonight.<\/p>\n . . .<\/p>\n After the capture of the USS Pueblo<\/em>, the US continued to conduct electronic reconnaissance in the Sea of Japan.\u00a0 Many of these missions were executed by USAF and\/or USN aircraft.<\/p>\n During the first quarter of 1969, US air reconnaissance missions had been flown over the Sea of Japan approximately 190 times without incident<\/a>.\u00a0 Because of that, the missions had come to be regarded as \u201cminimal risk\u201d and were flown without fighter escort.<\/p>\n Unfortunately that risk profile changed, dramatically and without warning, on 15 April 1969.<\/p>\n On 15 April 1969, a US Navy EC-131M \u2013 call sign Deep Sea 129<\/em> \u2013 flew a routine reconnaissance mission over the Sea of Japan.\u00a0 At roughly 1350 local time, while approximately 90 NM off the North Korean coast southeast of Chongjin, the plane was shot down by North Korean MiGs.\u00a0 All 31 US personnel on board were killed.<\/p>\n . . .<\/p>\n Deep Sea 129<\/em> took off at approximately 0700 local time<\/a> from NAS Atsugi, Japan.\u00a0 Because the mission was deemed \u201cminimal risk\u201d, it flew its mission over the Sea of Japan unescorted \u2013 as had close to 200 other reconnaissance missions earlier that year.<\/p>\n The crew were experienced; they’d flown similar missions before. They arrived on-station and began flying slow, repetitive “racetrack” patterns over the Sea of Japan.<\/p>\n The mission proceeded normally for several hours.\u00a0 Their orders were to remain a minimum of 50 NM off the coast of North Korea.\u00a0 Those orders were followed.<\/p>\n Though they were flying unescorted, Deep Sea 129<\/em> was neither forgotten nor completely neglected.\u00a0 They \u2013 and the tactical situation \u2013 were being closely monitored by USAF assets in South Korea.\u00a0 Early warning radars were tracking their location, as well as North Korean air activity.\u00a0 USAF monitoring stations were also tracking North Korean voice and Morse code nets associated with air defense operations.\u00a0 In addition, a NAVSECGRU listening post in Japan was apparently intercepting Russian air defense radar communications relating to the mission, providing second source information regarding Deep Sea 129\u2019s<\/em> location.<\/p>\n Deep Sea 129<\/em> submitted a routine report via teletype at approximately 1300 local time. \u00a0It continued its mission.<\/p>\n However 26 minutes previously – at approximately 1234 local – USAF and Army Security Agency assets had detected the takeoff of two North Korean MiG-17 aircraft.\u00a0 Under the assumption that these MiG-17s might be responding to Deep Sea 129<\/em>, the MiGs were tracked.<\/p>\n Radar contact with these two MiG-17s was temporarily lost at approximately 1322.\u00a0 They were reacquired on radar again at 1337, heading in the direction of Deep Sea 129<\/em> on what appeared to be an intercept course.<\/p>\n Deep Sea 129<\/em> was notified to abort its mission and return to base at 1344.\u00a0 The commander acknowledged and turned towards home.<\/p>\n Unfortunately, the EC-121M is a relatively slow plane.\u00a0 The MiG-17, though not supersonic, is decidedly not<\/span> slow.<\/p>\n The MiG-17 and Deep Sea 129\u2019s<\/em> radar tracks merged at 1347.\u00a0 At 1349 local \u2013 or 2349 EDT, 14 April 1969 \u2013 Deep Sea 129\u2019s<\/em> radar track disappeared.\u00a0 It was 90 NM off the coast of North Korea at the time.<\/p>\n Deep Sea 129’s<\/em> radar track never reappeared.\u00a0 The aircraft never returned to base.<\/p>\n . . .<\/p>\n US air and naval forces quickly began a search for survivors.\u00a0 Soviet naval forces assisted.\u00a0 Two bodies were recovered, as was aircraft wreckage.\u00a0 The wreckage recovered showed shrapnel damage.<\/p>\n The North Koreans acknowledged shooting down the aircraft.\u00a0 They claimed they had done so because Deep Sea 129<\/em> had \u201cviolated their territorial airspace\u201d.<\/p>\n At the time, North Korea claimed airspace out to 50 NM as their territory \u2013 a claim that was not internationally recognized as valid. Regardless, Deep Sea 129<\/em> did not come within 50 NM of North Korea on that mission.<\/p>\n Airborne reconnaissance missions over the Sea of Japan were briefly suspended after the incident, but were reinstated 3 days later \u2013 now with fighter escort.\u00a0 There were no attempts by North Korea to interfere with these missions after they were resumed.<\/p>\n . . .<\/p>\n Unlike the USS Pueblo<\/em>, I\u2019m not so sure that this incident was reasonably foreseeable.\u00a0 Yes, it occurred during a period of relatively high tension, and after the USS Pueblo\u2019s<\/em> seizure.\u00a0 However, the previous 190+ missions that year had been flown without incident.\u00a0 Fighter escort flights are expensive, are themselves somewhat provocative, and are also inherently risky for the fighter crews involved even if no enemy is encountered.\u00a0 The mission was flown with ROE that seemed at the time to be reasonable and non-confrontational.\u00a0 Even though the US rejected the validity of North Korea\u2019s 50 NM territorial airspace claim, US aircraft still stayed well outside that distance in order to give North Korea no excuses for hostile action.<\/p>\n Indeed, some accounts say US intelligence sources obtained information indicating the attack appeared to be due to an error between North Korean ground control personnel and the aircraft involved<\/a>.\u00a0 Those accounts also indicate that the Soviets appeared shocked when they realized that the North Koreans had shot down a US aircraft.<\/p>\n Could we have done something to prevent this incident?\u00a0 Certainly.\u00a0 But were the procedures in-place that day reasonable, all things considered?\u00a0 I’m not absolutely certain, but IMO yes\u00a0\u2013 I think they were.\u00a0 I think those in charge simply got blindsided by something that was not rationally foreseeable.\u00a0 An irrational act or an error of this magnitude is very difficult to predict.<\/p>\n . . .<\/p>\n I\u2019d like to believe that this incident was due to error vice malice.\u00a0 But I’m not sure I truly believe that.\u00a0 I have my doubts, for three reasons.<\/p>\n First:\u00a0 the incident occurred during a period of increased Korean hostilities sometimes called the Second Korean War (1966-1969)<\/a>.\u00a0 The level of provocations, incidents, and hostile acts on and around the Korean peninsula during those three years was higher than any other time since the Korean War proper.\u00a0 The US was also distracted by our ongoing involvement in\u00a0\u2013 Vietnam, and by a recent change in Presidential Administration.\u00a0 Together, these facts support\u00a0\u2013 but don’t prove\u00a0\u2013 the argument that the incident was an intentional provocation committed at a time when North Korea knew the US would almost certainly be less vigilant than normal while also less capable of a major response.<\/p>\n Second:\u00a0 in April 1969, Ho Chi Mihn\u2019s health was failing (he would die that September).\u00a0 North Korea might have felt that such an attack would not only serve their interests\u00a0\u2013 they were still trying to weaken the US-South Korean alliance\u00a0\u2013 but might also provide a morale boost to both Ho and North Vietnam by striking a blow against a common enemy.<\/p>\n And, lastly:\u00a0 15 April 1969 was Kim Il Sung\u2019s 57th birthday<\/em>.<\/p>\n . . .<\/p>\n The memory of this incident has faded with time; few remember it today.\u00a0 But the sacrifice made by these 31 Americans deserves to be remembered and honored.<\/p>\n