{"id":33138,"date":"2012-12-09T05:34:46","date_gmt":"2012-12-09T09:34:46","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/valorguardians.com\/blog\/?p=33138"},"modified":"2015-02-07T13:48:30","modified_gmt":"2015-02-07T18:48:30","slug":"hell-and-high-water","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.azuse.cloud\/?p=33138","title":{"rendered":"Hell and High Water"},"content":{"rendered":"

Gettysburg<\/em>.<\/p>\n

To any American with even a rudimentary knowledge of military history, that word speaks volumes.\u00a0 The battle itself, its historical impact, the heroism, the second-guessing . . . . \u00a0all of these are legendary.\u00a0 \u00a0Literally hundreds of books have been written concerning various aspects of the battle and its aftermath.<\/p>\n

Yet certain parts of the battle remain under-appreciated today. That\u2019s true even of some that are well-known.<\/p>\n

In fact, that\u2019s true for one of the great acts of heroism which occurred at Gettysburg.\u00a0 IMO, it’s one of the greatest acts of collective heroism in military history – ranking with Gideon’s Band, the Spartans at Themopylae, and the Charge of the Light Brigade.\u00a0 Yet it is an action for which none of the participants received any substantial personal recognition other than after-the-fact praise.\u00a0 The human cost was extreme.\u00a0 And it remains controversial even today.<\/p>\n

But that\u2019s to be expected.\u00a0 Any military operation involving 52+% casualties should be expected to have both heroic and controversial aspects.\u00a0 That\u2019s especially true when it involves roughly 12,500 men.<\/p>\n

I\u2019m referring to Pickett\u2019s Charge.<\/p>\n

Background.<\/span><\/p>\n

Gettysburg \u2013 and the US Civil War \u2013 came at a time where technology had provided the means to change the nature of ground combat.\u00a0 However, doctrine and tactics had not yet caught up with changed technology.\u00a0 The result was a war fought often with old-style tactics using more modern weapons.<\/p>\n

Predictably, the results were horrific.<\/p>\n

Napoleonic-era formations and tactics largely persisted. This was true in spite of the continued advances in artillery (dramatically more accurate, with better anti-personnel capability) and the mass adoption of rifles vice smoothbore muskets by infantry.\u00a0 Between those two recent developments, troops could now accurately engage and kill each other at ranges of hundreds of yards vice only at close range.\u00a0 Further, additional technical developments \u2013 such as repeating rifles and fused shells \u2013 added to the vulnerability of exposed soldiers and the potential lethality of a prepared defender.<\/p>\n

In short:\u00a0 war had transitioned from an era favoring elan and offense (the Napoleonic era) to one favoring preparation and defense.\u00a0 The defender could now kill at long range, from a concealed position.\u00a0 And if\/when attackers massed, they could be killed on an industrial scale –\u00a0 quickly.<\/p>\n

Leadership on both sides seemed slow to recognize or embrace these changes.\u00a0 A brief look at the Confederate leadership is illustrative. After a brief bit of defensive orientation early in the war – and after being derided as the \u201cKing of Spades\u201d for same – Lee reverted to the Napoleonic model of the attack.\u00a0 Jackson focused on speed and audacious maneuver \u2013 and reportedly requisitioned pikes<\/em> for at least some of his troops.\u00a0 The same was true of most other senior Confederate generals.<\/p>\n

Longstreet seemed to understand the magnitude and impact of the changes, as well as grasping how they dictated the beginnings of modern small-unit infantry tactics (coordinated combination of fire and maneuver by small elements; use of field fortifications and trenching; and the inherent advantage offered the defense given the weapons of his day).\u00a0 But Longstreet was not an eloquent speaker, and was unable to persuade.<\/p>\n

Longstreet was also not in overall command of Confederate forces at Gettysburg; that was Lee.\u00a0 But in an ironic twist of fate, it was Longstreet who was fated to give the final approval\u00a0 for Pickett\u2019s charge.<\/p>\n

Gettysburg.<\/span><\/p>\n

I won\u2019t rehash the entire 3-day battle in detail here; various works do so far better than can I.\u00a0 But a summary may be helpful to set the stage.<\/p>\n

Day 1 was the meeting engagement that began the battle.\u00a0 Buford\u2019s inspired early defense east of Gettysburg forced a premature Confederate deployment, buying time for Union reinforcements to arrive, and later to occupy the vital ground of Cemetery Ridge.\u00a0 Early Union reinforcements initially defended north and east of the town.\u00a0 These Union forces at first held; however, subsequent Confederate attacks in greater strength forced Union defenders to retreat through the town of Gettysburg.\u00a0 They did so to positions on the northern end of Cemetery Ridge and Culp\u2019s Hill, which eventually formed the extreme Union right.<\/p>\n

Day 2 included continued arrival of reinforcements for both sides; adjustments\/extensions in positions; and Ewell\u2019s demonstration against the northern part of the Union position (Culp\u2019s Hill) as well as secondary attacks against the Union center by Hill.\u00a0 It ended with Longstreet\u2019s afternoon attack against the Union left – including the famous and desperate fighting at the Peach Orchard, Devil\u2019s Den, Wheat Field, and (most critically) Little Round Top.\u00a0 But at the end of the day, the Union lines \u2013 though badly battered – still held.<\/p>\n

Day 3 of the battle started with an attack on the far right of the Union line (Culp\u2019s Hill and the northern end of Cemetery Ridge) , with savage fighting for several hours.\u00a0 Then in the early afternoon came the battle\u2019s culmination:\u00a0 a multi-division infantry attack on the Union center.<\/p>\n

Pickett\u2019s Charge.<\/p>\n

The Assault.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Map Depicting Pickett’s Charge (courtesy Wikipedia Commons ); Little Round Top is off the map to the south of the southern end of Cemetery Ridge)<\/p>\n

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The plan for the assault was simple:\u00a0 Confederate artillery would bombard a small part of the Union center with all available guns, battering it severely.\u00a0 Massed Confederate infantry would then assault that Union center, breaking it \u2013 and with it, the Army of the Potomac.<\/p>\n

The infantry attack would begin from the present day locations of the North Carolina and Virginia Memorials on or near Seminary Ridge, attacking towards the center-right of the Union line.\u00a0 (The precise locations of these memorials are shown on this NPS map<\/a> \u2013 it\u2019s PDF, and It\u2019s fairly large.\u00a0 They’re generally near the starting positions of Pettigrew’s and Pickett’s divisions on the above map.)\u00a0 The Confederate infantry would stay concealed as long as possible.\u00a0 It would then form, and assault the Union Center.\u00a0 The attack would involve three full divisions – roughly 12,500 men.<\/p>\n

The precise location of the objective of the charge is in dispute.\u00a0 Suffice it to say that the area called \u201cThe Angle\u201d \u2013 so named because it was formed by a right-angle of two stone fences \u2013 is close enough if not exact.<\/p>\n

In their assault, the Confederate infantry would cross approximately 1,200 meters \u2013 about 3\/4 mile \u2013 of open, gently rolling terrain.\u00a0 It would then assault, uphill, into a fortified Union line.<\/p>\n

As it turns out, the Confederate infantry would also attack largely without artillery support once preparatory fires had been completed.\u00a0 Though the Confederate artillery preparation was massive – 150 to 170 guns, reputedly the largest artillery concentration of the war to that date – the Confederate Army was short on artillery ammunition.\u00a0 It fired most of its ammunition during the preparatory fires.<\/p>\n

The attacking Confederate infantry would pass in and out of view of both the enemy and their comrades as they crossed undulating ground.<\/p>\n

They would cross a significant obstacle \u2013 a fenced, sunken road (Emmitsburg Road) \u2013 at about the time they came into rifle range of the enemy.<\/p>\n

They would assault while receiving heavy fire from both Union artillery and infantry – firing largely from covered and at least partially-concealed positions – from both flank and front.\u00a0 As it turns out, the Confederate preparatory fires were not particularly effective.\u00a0 Moreover, much of the Union artillery deliberately ceased fire during the Confederate preparatory fires, feigning destruction – until after the Confederate preparatory fires were over and the infantry assault had begun.<\/p>\n

Should you want an overview of what the average Confederate infantry soldier in Pickett\u2019s charge saw as he assaulted the Union lines on that fateful day, Andrew Weigel has an excellent site<\/a> that details both main assault routes in photographs.\u00a0 On a pleasant day, either route is about a 1\/2 hour one-way stroll.\u00a0 Since the first part of the \u201ccharge\u201d was at a route-step march, it likely didn\u2019t take all that much less time on 3 July 1863 either \u2013 probably about 20 minutes or so).<\/p>\n

But that\u2019s 20 minutes or so while in the open, exposed – and under murderous enemy fire.\u00a0 In other words: \u00a0 it was about\u00a0 a 20 minute stroll through hell. Each way.<\/p>\n

The Battlefield.<\/span><\/p>\n

Here\u2019s the terrain the Confederate infantry would cross, as seen in 2009 from the Virginia Memorial (from Weigel\u2019s site):<\/p>\n

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And here\u2019s the view from the North Carolina Memorial \u2013 again, courtesy of Weigel\u2019s site:<\/p>\n

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Here\u2019s the view from the center of the Union line, near The Angle:<\/p>\n

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(image from Wikipedia commons)<\/p>\n

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A photograph of what the Union forces on Little Round Top saw, looking northward at the right flank of the Confederate assault, may be found here<\/a>; more photographs of the battlefield may be found at the same site here<\/a>. \u00a0 (These are actual photographs taken during or shortly after the battle.)<\/p>\n

Cross that, under fire?\u00a0 Even in the 1860s, that would be close to suicide.<\/p>\n

For many, it was. Yet they still tried.<\/p>\n

Union artillery raked the Confederate flank from Little Round Top during Pickett’s Charge with murderous effect, probably using both solid shot and canister. \u00a0 Union artillery on Cemetery Hill to the north of the Union center (no photos available) similarly pounded the left flank of the Confederate attack.\u00a0 Union artillery in the line raked the troops from the front.\u00a0 And when they came within range, the Union infantry deployed along Cemetery Ridge engaged them with rifle fire.<\/p>\n

The Confederate infantry crossed the fenced road (Emmitsburg Road), then assaulted uphill.\u00a0 Some reached the crest of Cemetery Ridge north of The Angle, briefly causing a small break in the Union line.\u00a0 But only a few from Armistead’s Brigade of Pickett’s Division made it that far.\u00a0 And Union reinforcements quickly arrived to seal the breach.<\/p>\n

The Confederates were then forced to retreat.\u00a0 And retreat they did, under fire, over the same 1,200 meters (3\/4 mile) they\u2019d crossed shortly before.<\/p>\n

The culmination of Pickett’s charge is often referred to as “the high water mark of the Confederacy”.\u00a0 A monument so named is found at Gettysburg on this spot.<\/p>\n

The name is apt.\u00a0 After Gettysburg – and after the Pyrrhic tactical victory but strategic failure at Chickamauga a bit over two months later – the Confederacy would never again have the capability to threaten the Union seriously.<\/p>\n

Pickett’s Charge Considered.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava occurred less than 9 years before Pickett’s Charge.\u00a0 It was (and still is) renowned for both its high casualty rate and the extreme courage shown by the attackers.\u00a0 Casualties among the Light Brigade (killed\/wounded\/missing) were approximately 40% – 287 casualties in approximately 670 participants.<\/p>\n

So what, then, are we to make of Pickett\u2019s Charge?<\/p>\n

At the beginning, the participants in Pickett’s Charge numbered 12,500.\u00a0 Less than 6,000 made it back uninjured.<\/p>\n

The total casualty rate among all<\/em> Confederate forces in Pickett\u2019s Charge was roughly 52%<\/em> – 6,551 casualties out of approximately 12,500 participants.\u00a0 Less than half of those who began the attack returned whole.<\/em><\/p>\n

Among the Confederate attackers, Pickett\u2019s division fared the worst (this sad fact likely led to the name for this action).\u00a0 In Pickett\u2019s division, total casualties exceeded 60%<\/em>.\u00a0 And as a group, the senior officers in Pickett’s division fared as badly – or in some cases, worse – as did their men.<\/p>\n