The following comes from an email we received from a young officer currently serving in Afghanistan. Given the vocal propensity of the crowd at This Ain’t Hell, he’s interested in your feelings and perspectives about what he reports to us from the front;<\/p>\n
Writing tonight out of a strange combination of frustration and hopefulness. Before I begin my question\/rant, I’d like to caveat by saying that in no way do I not support the war effort. I’d think that would be obvious since I’m over here playing an active role in the prosecution of this conflict. (11 series is my MOS (Military Occupational Specialty) for those of you who are curious) However, I still wanted it make that clear before I began.<\/p>\n
The progress in this war is very different depending on the viewpoints you solicit. At the higher [command] levels, we (DOD) are crowing about the massive advances the Afghan forces are making without US\/ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) support.<\/p>\n
We talk about the provinces that have been handed over to the Afghan government for security and stability (none of these are “high-threat” areas). We speak about them being able to “stand alone” against an ever weakening enemy. Unfortunately it seems as if this war has become a house of cards waiting to tumble down. The arbitrary timetable of withdrawal has led to a rushed mentality where we choose not to fully reveal the true nature of things on the ground here, including ourselves (US Military). <\/p>\n
Briefings sent higher [up the chain of command], created for the purpose of highlighting the actual status of our Afghan partners are “modified” to reflect a more rosy perspective. When partnership percentages are too close to the chilling reality (11 ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) contribute to a company “Joint” mission) we massage the numbers, removing our enablers and counting support ANSF soldiers who will not actively support the mission to more aptly reflect the illusion that we are making progress in this handover. <\/p>\n
ANSF are isolated and distrusted, with good reason. Theft, desertion, outright attacks (Green on Blue events), and intelligence leaks that are so pervasive we may as well just air-drop our CONOPs (Concept Of Operation) over Taliban villages infect every level of their military organization. <\/p>\n
The reality is these people (Afghans) are no closer to ensuring their own sovereignty than they were when our first SF teams began to descend on this wonderful country over 11 years ago. Corruption cannot be understated, and as a way of life is completely incompatible with our goals for this war effort. <\/p>\n
Alright, that’s just one officer’s two cents. Rant is now over. What I’d really like to hear is the perspectives of you “old-timers”, no offense meant, who were there in the closing days of ‘Nam. What was the perspective of the troops on the ground when they were asked to fight and die for a nation populated by people who had no desire to improve their lot in life through hardship or shared danger? Is this way off-base? Maybe the final days of Vietnam were so dissimilar as to be incomparable, but I’d still welcome the feedback. <\/p>\n
The perspective here is that we could win this war if we could actually fight it. Endless restrictions and “risk-averse” policies that filter down from higher [headquarters] in an endless deluge only stunt our actual progress on the ground. In an effort to stay positive I’d like to know if any of you share similar views, or if not, could offer some perspective to an officer leading men who, when asked why they’re still fighting reply: it’s for the paycheck.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
I’ve edited some of this email for spelling and defined some of the terms that might not be familiar to the whole crowd. Other than those few edits, the rest of this are the words of that young officer.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"