Last September, the Taliban staged an attack on USMC aviation assets at Camp Bastion, Afghanistan. Fifteen Taliban insurgents infiltrated the perimeter, then attacked with RPGs and small arms. Two Marines – Lt. Col. Christopher Raible and Sgt. Bradley Atwell – were killed during that attack; 9 other coalition personnel were wounded. Six aircraft were destroyed. Heroic action on the part of the first defenders on the scene prevented both greater loss of life and materiel.
However, now questions have been raised about just how well prepared Camp Bastion was to counter ground infiltration immediately prior to the attack. And it also appears that the answers to those questions are, well, troubling.
Some background: Camp Bastion is a British-run installation in Helmand province. It is adjacent to Camp Leatherneck – the main USMC installation in the area.
Camp Leatherneck does not have an airfield suitable for Harrier operations; Camp Bastion does. Therefore, USMC Harrier assets – as well as a number of Marines – are stationed on Camp Bastion.
As a British-run installation, perimeter security at Camp Bastion was the responsibility of British forces. Taliban forces penetrated the base perimeter to conduct the attack.
There were apparently some significant . . . known issues regarding perimeter security at Camp Bastion prior the night of the attack. Specifically,
- in the month prior to the attack, the number of USMC personnel conducting ground patrols in the local area had been reduced by nearly 70% (from 325 personnel to 100) due to in-country personnel reductions.
- the guard tower nearest the point of infiltration was unmanned the night of the attack; other nearby guard posts could not observe all of the perimeter visible from the unmanned guard tower.
- the guard towers were manned by non-Afghan allied personnel who apparently had a reputation of falling asleep while on guard duty.
These issues were known (or in the case of the “blind areas” due to the unmanned guard post, certainly should have been known) to both US and British personnel. The resulting risks were accepted.
In retrospect, those risks obviously should not have been taken. The cutback in patrolling allowed the Taliban to conduct substantial pre-attack reconnaissance. This in-turn allowed them to determine tower manning, blind spots, and prepare detailed maps to support the attack – one of which they posted publicly afterwards. And tolerating guard personnel sleeping while on duty is a “NO GO” – allied sensibilities notwithstanding.
The USMC reportedly did not initially conduct a formal investigation of the attack, because it occurred on Camp Bastion vice a USMC installation. They have since conducted a review, but apparently do not plan to release the results to the public. The British likewise do not plan to release the results of their investigation the public, either.
I’m well aware that accepting risk is a part of war, and that the enemy “gets a vote” in how things turn out. Sometimes the enemy is good, or just gets lucky. However, in this case it appears maybe we took some risks we really shouldn’t have.
And it also looks like we’re going to try and bury the truth for a while, to avoid embarrassing an ally.
I think that’s the wrong answer here. If we don’t learn from our mistakes, we’ll likely just repeat them. And mistakes that aren’t made public have a way of getting forgotten or ignored.
Sorry – but IMO the casualties that day deserve a bit better than that.
One article giving more details concerning the above may be found here; a second, even more detailed article may be found here. Both IMO are worth reading.
